Cognitive flexibility amongst angry ruminators and the effects of angry rumination on interpersonal problem solving. by Finnigan, E.
Volume 1
Cognitive Flexibility amongst Angry Ruminators and the Effects of 
Angry Rumination on Interpersonal Problem Solving
Eiryth Finnigan 
D.Clin.Psy. 2006 
University College London
UMI Number: U592772
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U592772
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Overview
The thesis is comprised of three parts: the literature review, the empirical paper, and the 
critical appraisal. The first part, the literature review, explores whether the theory and 
research relating to depressive rumination can be applied to angry rumination. In 
particular, it asks whether angry rumination functions in the same way as depressive 
rumination, and whether it leads to the same negative consequences that have been 
found for depressive rumination. In order to explore these questions, the main research 
findings and theoretical accounts relating to depressive rumination are reviewed. Also, 
theory that suggests a similar, as well as a different, role for angry and depressive 
rumination is presented, and the small amount of experimental research that has been 
conducted on angry rumination is reviewed and discussed in light of this theory. The 
second part, the empirical paper, goes on to investigate whether the findings from two 
areas of the depressive rumination literature can be applied to angry rumination. More 
specifically, as depressive rumination has been found to be associated with an inflexible 
and perseverative cognitive style and lead to impairments in interpersonal problem 
solving, the empirical paper examines whether this is also true of angry rumination. 
Finally, the third part, the critical appraisal, explores the methodological and conceptual 
issues encountered during the process of conducting the research project. It focuses 
primarily on the difficulties involved in inducing anger and rumination, and measuring 
interpersonal problem solving. It also includes a reflection on what could have been 
done differently.
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Part 1: Literature Review
Angry Rumination and its Relationship to Depressive Rumination: 
Can the Theory and Research Findings from the Depressive 
Rumination Literature be Applied to Anger?
7
1. Abstract
In recent years there has been increased interest in the role that rumination plays in 
psychological disorders. However, the majority of the research and theory has revolved 
around rumination in the context of a depressed mood. Whilst rumination has been 
theoretically linked to anger control problems, little research has been conducted into 
angry rumination. As a result, not much is known about the nature, process, functions, 
or consequences of angry rumination. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the 
theory and research relating to depressive rumination can be applied to anger. The aim 
of this paper will be to explore whether angry rumination functions in the same way as 
depressive rumination, and whether the findings from the depressive rumination 
literature can be applied to anger. The paper will begin by reviewing the main research 
findings relating to depressive rumination. The theoretical accounts that have been put 
forward to explain why people engage in depressive rumination will then be presented. 
Theory that supports a similar role for angry and depressive rumination will be 
explored, as well as theory that suggests that angry rumination may have different 
functions and consequences to depressive rumination. A review of the experimental 
research on angry rumination will then be conducted, as well as a discussion of how the 
findings relate to theory. The paper ends with suggestions for further research.
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2. Introduction
Since Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) Response Styles Theory, the role of rumination in 
depression has received a great deal of attention. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) defined 
depressive rumination as thoughts and behaviours that focus the depressed individual’s 
attention on his or her symptoms (e.g. how tired one feels) and the possible causes and 
consequences of those symptoms (e.g. not being able to get work done because of 
feeling unmotivated). In terms of its phenomenology, rumination has been described as 
an ongoing stream of thoughts that keeps the individual stuck dwelling on negative 
themes, such as past mistakes. It may take the form of “why” questions, such as “why 
me?” or “why do I feel like this?”, and it is experienced by the person as involuntary, 
repetitive, persistent and distressing. It often escalates from an initial trigger to 
numerous problems and memories, and despite its distressing nature the individual often 
feels compelled to do it (Watkins, 2003).
Rumination is clinically significant because it has been given a central role in several 
theories of depression (e.g. Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Teasdale & Barnard, 
1993). In addition to its importance within depression, rumination has also been 
implicated in a range of other psychological disorders (Ingram, 1990). For example, 
Watkins (2003) argued that rumination is an important feature in both anxiety and anger 
disorders. Also, Wells and Matthews (1994) proposed that rumination and worry are 
central to the maintenance of all emotional disorders because of their role in enhancing 
intrusive negative thinking and priming attention to self-focused and mood congruent
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material (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003). However, despite its hypothesised role in 
other psychological disorders, rumination has primarily been formulated and 
investigated within the context of a depressed mood.
The aim of this paper will be to explore whether the theory and research findings 
relating to depressive rumination can be applied to anger. In particular, this paper will 
be asking whether rumination in the context of an angry mood functions in the same 
way as it does in a depressed mood, and whether it leads to the same negative 
consequences that have been found within the depressive rumination literature. To 
achieve this aim, the research and theory relating to depressive rumination will be 
reviewed. Literature that suggests a similar role for rumination in anger and depression 
will be presented, as well as any literature that indicates that rumination in anger may 
function in a different way to rumination in depression. The scant experimental 
evidence that has been conducted on rumination in the context of an angry mood will be 
reviewed and discussed in light of the literature. Finally, a number of possible directions 
for future research will be proposed.
3. Depressive Rumination
3.1. Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response Styles Theory (1991)
The main premise of Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response Styles Theory (1991) was that the 
way in which individuals typically respond to their depressed moods influences the
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duration of these moods. More specifically, she hypothesised that individuals with a 
ruminative style of responding to depressed mood would have more prolonged periods 
of depressed mood. She defined this ruminative response style as a pattern of 
behaviours and thoughts that focus the individual’s attention on his or her mood state 
and inhibit any actions that might distract the individual from this mood state. She 
characterised the ruminative response style as a behavioural attentional style, which she 
hypothesised was a stable, individual difference characteristic.
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed three mechanisms by which a ruminative response 
style may influence the duration of depression. Firstly, she hypothesised that ruminative 
responses allow depressed mood to influence thinking. Several theorists have proposed 
that one way depression is maintained is by its effects on information processing, in that 
a vicious cycle develops in which depressed mood leads to negative attributions and 
self-evaluations, which, in turn, leads to further depressed mood (e.g. Blaney, 1986; 
Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1983). Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) hypothesised that when 
individuals engage in ruminative responses to depressed mood they may be more likely 
to fall into this vicious cycle. Secondly, she proposed that a ruminative response style 
may interfere with instrumental behaviour, in that individuals who ruminate may not 
engage in behaviours that provide positive reinforcement and a sense of control in one’s 
environment, which, in turn, may contribute to learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) 
and increased depression. Also, failures that result from these difficulties in engaging in 
instrumented behaviour may lead to lowered expectations for future success and 
decreased motivation. Finally, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) suggested that rumination may
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interfere with effective problem solving because it makes negative cognitions more 
accessible and impedes the initiation of positive behaviours. The resulting difficulties in 
problem solving may then help to maintain the depressed mood.
3.2. Review of Research on Depressive Rumination
Since the introduction of the Response Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), an 
extensive body of research has been generated by Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues 
into the role of rumination in depression. This research has consistently provided 
support for the Response Styles Theory, and its main findings will be summarised 
below.
3.2.1. Prospective Studies
A number of prospective studies have been conducted that have shown that a 
ruminative response style predicts the onset of depressive symptoms or episodes. For 
example, Just and Alloy (1997) found that, amongst non-depressed participants, those 
who reported ruminating in response to their depressive symptoms were more likely to 
experience a depressive episode over a period of 18 months than participants who 
reported that they distract themselves from their symptoms. In this study, a ruminative 
response style was also found to predict the severity of the depressive episode. 
Similarly, Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991a) found that the presence of a 
ruminative response style predicted depressive symptoms in college students 7 weeks
12
after an earthquake, even after controlling for initial levels of depression. A ruminative 
response style has also been found to predict the severity of depression. In addition to 
the Just and Alloy (1997) study quoted above, Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker and Larson
(1994) found that amongst people who were bereaved, those who tended to ruminate 
about their depressive symptoms one month after their loss were more severely 
depressed six months after their loss compared to bereaved people who did not tend to 
ruminate. This relationship held after controlling for initial levels of depressive 
symptoms, amount of social support, stress and gender. Finally, rumination has been 
found to predict the duration of a depressive episode (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & 
Fredrickson, 1993). Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1993) asked participants to monitor their 
moods and their responses to their moods for 30 days. They found that the more 
participants engaged in ruminative responses to their depressed moods, the longer were 
their periods of depressed moods, even after taking into account the initial severity of 
the mood.
With the exception of the Just and Alloy (1997) study, the studies cited above examined 
the role of rumination in predicting depressive symptoms. However, two studies have 
also found that rumination predicts clinical levels of depression. Kuehner and Weber 
(1999) found that amongst a sample of clinically depressed participants, rumination 
predicted future levels of depression, even when baseline levels of depression were 
accounted for. Also, amongst a sub-sample of patients, rumination predicted the 
presence of a major depressive episode at three-month follow-up. In addition, Nolen-
13
Hoeksema (2000) found that a ruminative response style predicted major depressive 
disorders, including new onsets of depressive episodes, at one-year follow-up.
3.2.2. Experimental Studies
A series of experimental studies have also been conducted by Nolen-Hoeksema and her 
colleagues, in which rumination has been compared with another mood regulation 
strategy, distraction. In these studies, dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants were 
induced to ruminate or distract. The results of these studies indicated that rumination in 
the presence of a dysphoric mood has negative consequences for mood, thinking and 
interpersonal problem solving.
Mood:
Amongst dysphoric participants, compared to a distraction manipulation, a rumination 
manipulation has been found to exacerbate or elevate dysphoric mood (e.g. 
Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1993, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). For example, Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow (1993) assigned moderately depressed and non-depressed participants to either 
a rumination or distraction task. For the moderately depressed participants, the 
rumination manipulation significantly increased depressed mood and the distraction 
manipulation significantly decreased depressed mood. Neither manipulation had 
significant effects on the mood of the non-depressed participants.
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Cognitive Distortions and Negative Thinking:
Rumination in the presence of a dysphoric mood has been found to increase cognitive 
distortions and negative thinking (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell & Berg, 1999). Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema
(1995) found that dysphoric participants who ruminated selected significantly more 
negatively distorted interpretations of hypothetical problematic events on the CBQ 
(Cognitive Bias Questionnaire; Krantz & Hammen, 1979) and significantly fewer non- 
depressed and non-distorted responses than the other three groups of participants (i.e. 
dysphoric distractors and non-dysphoric ruminators and distractors). Also, dysphoric 
ruminators made significantly more pessimistic attributions for the negative 
hypothetical situations (i.e. high stability, intemality, and globality) than the other three 
groups. Therefore, dysphoric ruminators gave more negatively biased interpretations of 
events and offered more pessimistic attributions for events than dysphoric distractors. 
Given that previous studies have found that negatively distorted thinking and 
pessimistic attributions can maintain and exacerbate dysphoria (e.g. Abramson, 
Metalsky & Alloy, 1989; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Sweeney, Anderson & Bailey, 
1986), the authors of this study suggested that one reason people who ruminate when 
dysphoric remain dysphoric for longer is that they are more likely to be engaging in 
negative, distorted thinking than people who distract.
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) also found that rumination in the presence 
of a dysphoric mood led to reduced expectations of the likelihood of future positive 
events. Dysphoric ruminators listed the same number of happy events that might happen
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to them in their future as the other three groups of participants. However, the dysphoric 
participants who ruminated rated these events as being significantly less likely to 
happen to them in their future compared to the other three groups. This suggests that 
whilst dysphoric ruminators do not differ from others in terms of their goals for the 
future, they have lower expectations of being able to attain these goals.
Negative Autobiographical Memories:
Rumination has been found to increase the accessibility of negative autobiographical 
memories (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring & Greenberg, 
1989). Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) found that rumination in the context of a depressed 
mood led students to retrieve more negative memories from their past and recall 
negative events (e.g. “my parents punished me unfairly”) as having occurred more 
frequently in their lives than positive events. Similarly, Pyszczynski et al. (1989) found 
that dysphoric participants who were induced to focus on themselves retrieved more 
negative events from their past than participants who were induced to focus externally. 
These authors suggest that rumination may increase the recall of negative memories by 
simply drawing one’s attention to the negative memories that have been made 
accessible by the depressed mood.
Interpersonal Problem Solving:
Dysphoric rumination has been shown to interfere with effective interpersonal problem 
solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2002). For example, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) found that
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dysphoric participants who were induced to ruminate on their feelings generated less 
effective solutions to interpersonal problems on the MEPS (Means-Ends Problem- 
Solving Procedure; Platt & Spivack, 1975) than non-dysphoric participants or dysphoric 
participants induced to distract. They hypothesised that whilst negative mood activates 
negative thinking, self-focused rumination brings these types of thoughts to the 
individual’s attention and allows them to interfere with their interpretations of current 
events, which, in turn, impairs their ability to find effective solutions to their problems.
Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) also examined the effects of dysphoric rumination on 
interpersonal problem solving. They found that dysphoric ruminators rated their 
problems as more severe and less solvable than dysphoric distractors and the non­
dysphoric participants. However, independent judges did not rate their problems as 
being any worse than those of the other participants. Also, whilst they found that there 
were no differences amongst the groups in terms of their confidence in the effectiveness 
of their solutions, dysphoric ruminators rated themselves as significantly less likely to 
implement their solutions that the other three groups. They also looked at the content of 
participants’ thoughts and found that dysphoric ruminators’ thoughts had a more 
negative tone, were more problem-focused, self-blaming and self-critical, and were less 
confident, less optimistic, and had less perceived control than the other three groups. In 
addition, they found that dysphoric ruminators produced significantly less effective 
solutions to problems on the MEPS than the other three groups. Finally, Lyubomirsky et 
al. (1999) found that problem solving effectiveness was significantly correlated with the 
content of participants’ negative thinking, in that it was associated with diminished
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negative tone, less focusing on one’s problems and feelings, less self-criticism, as well 
as increased self-confidence and perceived control. From these results, the authors 
concluded that rumination interferes with all three stages of problem solving (i.e. 
definition or appraisal of the problem, generation of alternative solutions and 
implementation; D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971), in that rumination led to biased 
appraisals of problems, less effective solutions to problems, and a reduced willingness 
to implement the solutions.
3.3. Spreading Activation or Associative Network Theories
Spreading activation or associative network theories of mood (e.g. Bower, 1981; Clark 
& Isen, 1981; Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1983) have been used by Nolen-Hoeksema and 
her colleagues (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995) to explain the effects of 
rumination and distraction on negative mood that were presented above. In these 
theories, emotions organise information stored in semantic networks in memory. Each 
emotion is believed to act as a central organising node that links together causally 
related information (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). When an emotion is triggered, 
other associated information in the network (e.g. memories, beliefs, schemas, action 
tendencies, and physiological responses) will also be activated, thus prolonging or 
augmenting the emotion. Therefore, according to these theories, a depressed mood will 
trigger the activation of a network of negative beliefs, memories and schemas, which 
will then lead to an intensification of the depressed mood. A number of studies have 
found support for these theories, in that they demonstrated that negative moods
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selectively prime mood congruent material (e.g. Bower, 1981; Clark & Teasdale, 1982; 
Krantz & Hammen, 1979; Teasdale, 1983, 1985). However, the research literature has 
not found consistent support for spreading activation theories. For example, several 
studies have found that whilst positive affect facilitated the recall of positively valenced 
material, negative affect failed to produce a similar result with negatively valenced 
material (e.g. Brown & Taylor, 1986; Gerrig & Bower, 1982; Mischel, Ebbesen & 
Zeiss, 1976)
Nolen-Hoeskema and her colleagues (e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995) 
hypothesised that rumination enhances the effects of depressed mood on negative 
thinking, in that by drawing attention to one’s depressed mood and symptoms, 
rumination increases the likelihood that the network of negatively biased thoughts, 
memories and schemas will be activated. Further, rumination is hypothesised to bring 
the negative thoughts and memories that were activated by the depressed mood to the 
attention of the person and allow them to affect the individual’s judgment and 
interpretation of current events. In turn, these negative thoughts, interpretations, and 
memories are believed to exacerbate the depressed mood, thus leading to the vicious 
cycle between depressed mood and thinking described by Teasdale (1985). 
Rumination’s negative effects on thinking are also proposed to impair the depressed 
individual’s ability to come up with effective solutions to their problems by, for 
example, leading to biased appraisals of their problems. Ineffective problem solving 
may then lead to more negative life events and stress, which may help to maintain 
depressed mood.
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3.4. Critiques of Nolen-Hoeksema and Colleagues’ Findings
Whilst the role of rumination as a key process in the onset and maintenance of 
depression has been well supported in the literature, some theorists have recently begun 
to query the way that rumination has been conceptualised and measured by Nolen- 
Hoeksema and her colleagues. In particular, a number of theorists have expressed 
reservations about the construct validity and clinical utility of the main tool used to 
measure rumination, the RSQ (Response Styles Questionnaire; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991b). For example, Kasch, Klein and Lara (2001) found that rumination, as 
measured by the Ruminative Response Scale of the RSQ, was not stable over a six- 
month period and was closely related to the severity of the depressive episode and other 
similar concepts (i.e. negative affectivity, emotion-focused coping and self-criticism). 
Further, they found that rumination was only minimally predictive of the six-month 
course and outcome of depression, whereas negative affectivity and self-criticism 
exhibited significant associations with the course of depression. Similarly, Spasojevic 
and Alloy (2001) found that rumination mediated the relationship between negative 
cognitive style, self-criticism and history of depression and the number of prospective 
episodes of major depression. Therefore, they argued that rumination may be a 
mechanism through which other vulnerability factors affect depression.
Several other studies have also addressed this issue of rumination (as measured by the 
RSQ) being confounded with the levels or severity of depression. For example, Bagby 
and Parker (2001) conducted a factor analysis on the RSQ and found three factors:
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distraction, symptom-focused rumination and self-focused rumination. They argued that 
the RSQ may be measuring two different types of rumination, in that self-focused 
rumination may be a more trait-like construct that could occur in the absence of a 
depressed mood, whereas symptom-focused rumination requires the presence of 
depressive symptoms and may therefore be linked to the severity of depressed mood. A 
recent study by Treynor, Gonzalez and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) attempted to address 
this potential problem of a component of the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) being 
confounded with the symptoms of depression. They removed the symptom related items 
on the RRS and found two factors that were differentially associated with concurrent 
and long-term severity of depression. The ‘reflective’ component was associated with 
higher current but lower long-term severity of depression, whilst the ‘brooding’ 
component was associated with both higher current and long-term severity. They argued 
that ‘reflection’ may be triggered by negative affect or result in negative affect in the 
short-term, but may actually be adaptive in reducing negative affect in the long-run, 
possibly because it leads to effective problem solving.
In addition to the concerns raised above regarding the RSQ, theorists have also argued 
that there may be problems with how rumination has been conceptualised by Nolen- 
Hoeksema and her colleagues. Watkins (2004) argued that despite the consistent 
findings that rumination leads to detrimental consequences, focusing on depressed 
mood can also lead to adaptive outcomes. In particular, he proposed that prolonged 
focus on negative emotional material is necessary for successful emotional processing 
(e.g. Hunt, 1998), and can lead to greater self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1990) and
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self-knowledge (Watkins, 2004). In order to reconcile these contradictory views of 
rumination, Watkins (2004) argued that it was important to attend to the precise way in 
which people focus on themselves, because different styles of self-focus can lead to 
different consequences (McFarland & Buehler, 1998; Teasdale, 1999). Indeed, 
numerous studies have indicated that there are different modes of self-focused attention, 
which each have distinct functional properties (McFarland & Buehler, 1998; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). For example, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) argued that the 
private self-consciousness construct may be comprised of two different types of self- 
awareness: reflective self-focus and ruminative self-focus. They found that reflective 
self-focus was motivated by epistemic curiosity and was correlated with openness-to- 
experience. In contrast, ruminative self-focus was found to be motivated by perceived 
losses and threats to the self and was correlated with neuroticism.
Watkins (2004) found support for his hypothesis that different styles of rumination have 
disparate effects on emotional processing. He asked participants to write about the 
experience of taking a test they had been induced to fail. One group was asked to write 
about the experience in a conceptual-evaluative mode (e.g. write about why they feel as 
they do and why they performed as they did), which involved a more analytical and 
evaluative way of thinking about the self. The other group was asked to write in an 
experiential mode (e.g. write about how you feel and how you attempted the test), 
which focused on a non-evaluative, experiential awareness of experience in the 
moment. Watkins (2004) found that amongst high ruminators a “how” (or experiential)
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style of self-focus improved emotional processing (i.e. lead to a faster recovery from the 
negative mood). He also found that the conceptual-evaluative mode led to poorer 
emotional processing, especially as levels of trait rumination increased. The findings 
from the Treynor et al. (2003) study mentioned above seem to be consistent with these 
results. Given that the ‘reflective’ component was associated with higher concurrent but 
lower long-term severity of depressed mood, it may be that it facilitated emotional 
processing in a similar way to the experiential mode of processing employed in this 
study. Similarly, the ‘brooding’ component, with its long-term negative outcomes for 
depression severity, may impede emotional processing, as was found to be the case for 
the conceptual-evaluative mode in this study.
Watkins and Baracaia (2002) also found that different styles of rumination had distinct 
consequences for interpersonal problem solving. In this study, currently depressed, 
recovered depressed and never depressed participants were asked to complete the 
MEPS (Platt & Spivack, 1975), whilst simultaneously thinking about questions in a 
conceptual-evaluative mode (e.g. focus on why you have a problem), an experiential 
mode (e.g. focus on how you decide to solve a problem), or a no question control. In the 
control condition, the currently depressed group was significantly impaired at 
interpersonal problem solving compared to the other two groups, who did not differ 
from one another. However, thinking about questions in an experiential mode 
significantly improved interpersonal problem solving in currently depressed 
participants. Also, having to think about questions in a conceptual-evaluative mode 
significantly impaired problem solving in the recovered depressed group, despite the
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fact that they did not differ from never depressed participants in the no question control. 
Therefore, these studies suggest that a more abstract, conceptual-evaluative (“why”) 
style of rumination compared to a more concrete, experiential (“how”) style leads to 
poorer problem solving and impaired emotional processing.
3.5. Theories of Depressive Rumination
Given the largely negative consequences that have been found for engaging in 
depressive rumination, it becomes important to understand why people respond to their 
depressed mood by ruminating. A number of theories have been put forward to explain 
why people engage in depressive rumination and they will be presented below.
3.5.7. Developmental Account ('Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991)
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) hypothesised that parents influence the development of their 
children’s styles of responding to negative mood. In particular, she proposed that 
children who feel little control over their environment and who have not been taught 
more adaptive, active ways of dealing with negative affect will be particularly prone to 
developing a ruminative response style. As evidence for this hypothesis, Nolen- 
Hoeksema (1991) cited the Nolen-Hoeksema, Wolfson, Mumme and Guskin (1990) 
study, which found that the way in which mothers responded to their children when 
they were frustrated predicted the children’s ability to problem solve and regulate their 
affect. In particular, they found that mothers who were intrusive and therefore did not
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allow their children to learn how to solve their own problems, who did not teach their 
children to try different approaches to solving a problem, and who were unsupportive 
and critical when their children failed had children with poorer problem solving skills 
and a greater tendency to respond to negative affect by becoming helpless and passive. 
Dweck (1998) found that children who tend to become helpless in the face of frustration 
are more likely to engage in rumination. Therefore, according to this account, parents 
who are overprotective and rejecting provide children with little opportunity to learn 
and try out different ways of coping with low mood or to develop a sense of mastery 
over their environment, which leads to the development of a passive, ruminative style of 
responding to their low mood, and which, in turn, increases their risk of becoming 
depressed in the future.
In support of this account, numerous studies have found that depressed people 
consistently report that they were raised by over-intrusive, over-controlling, 
authoritarian and rejecting parents (e.g. Barber, 1996; Burbach & Bourduin, 1986; 
Gerlsma, Emmelkamp & Arrindell, 1990). Also, Spasojevic and Alloy (2002) found 
that reports of over-controlling parenting were significantly related to participants’ 
scores on the Ruminative Response Scale of the RSQ. They also demonstrated that 
rumination fully mediated the relationship between over-controlling parenting and the 
number of major depressive episodes experienced by the participants during the follow- 
up period. However, these studies have relied upon retrospective accounts, which may 
be subject to biases and inaccuracies in recall. Longitudinal studies are needed in order 
to elucidate the developmental antecedents of ruminative response styles.
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3.5.2. Goal Discrepancy Account (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Martin & Tesser, 1996; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987)
These are self-regulatory models in which discrepancies between goal states and actual 
states are hypothesised to result in processing in order to resolve the discrepancies. In 
these accounts, rumination is seen as recurring thoughts that focus on the self and on 
problems in an attempt to reach goal states (Martin & Tesser, 1996). Further, Martin 
and Tesser (1996) argued that rumination is generally adaptive in helping individuals to 
solve their problems. Similarly, Carver and Scheier (1990) conceptualised ruminative 
self-focus as part of a self-regulatory negative feedback cycle, which functions to keep 
individuals on track in pursuit of important goals. In this model, when a goal or 
behavioural standard is salient the individual compares their current state with that 
standard. If they have met or exceeded the standard then they exit the cycle and cease to 
self-focus. However, if they fall short of the standard, they will engage in behaviour that 
is aimed at bringing them closer to their goal. If the individual is unlikely to reach their 
goal, they will typically experience negative affect and will disengage from the goal. 
Carver and Scheier (1990) argued that an individual’s ability to disengage from 
unobtainable goals is an important part of normal self-regulation because it allows the 
person to pursue alternative goals. However, if the person is unable to disengage from 
the goal because it is very important to the person or central to how they view 
themselves, this self-regulatory process gets stuck in a loop. This, in turn, leads to
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unhelpful rumination on the negative feelings that arise from being unable to let go of 
something unattainable, which results in depression.
Consistent with these models, rumination has been found to be prompted by 
discrepancies in goal progress, especially for goals seen as being central to personal 
well-being (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Millar, Tesser & Millar, 1988). Also, McIntosh and 
Martin (1992) found that people who link lower-order goals (e.g. appearance) to higher- 
order goals (e.g. happiness) experience more rumination and negative affect when their 
lower-order goals are not attained. Whilst these models have good explanatory power 
for depressive episodes that are triggered by a disruption in progress towards an 
important goal (e.g. loss of a job), they may be less able to explain episodes that do not 
appear to be precipitated by an external stressor.
3.5.3. Behavioural Activation Account (Martell, Addis & Jacobson, 2001)
In this model, the focus is on the context in which depression occurs. This approach 
emphasises the need to look at the function and consequences of thoughts and 
behaviours associated with depression, rather than their content. It focuses on the 
environmental factors that might be connected with the individual’s depression and how 
the individual’s responses to those environmental factors might be maintaining their 
depressed mood. Ferster (1973) hypothesised that escape and avoidance are key 
motivating goals in depression, and that many behaviours seen in depression (e.g. 
inactivity, withdrawal and inertia) may serve this function. These avoidance behaviours
27
provide temporary relief (i.e. escape from aversive environments), but, in the long run, 
they deny people access to sources of positive reinforcement. Therefore, in this account, 
rumination must also be viewed in terms of its function and consequences within the 
context that it occurs. As with other behaviours associated with depression, rumination 
is hypothesised to function as a means of avoiding aversive experiences. For example, 
like worry, rumination has been proposed to function as a means of cognitive avoidance 
(Borkovec, Ray & Stober, 1998), in that thinking in an analytical way about why things 
have gone wrong allows one to avoid the distress associated with detailed memories of 
painful past events. Rumination may also function to keep the person safe from taking 
risks and failing. Therefore, in this theory, rumination is viewed as a part of a set of 
unhelpful escape and avoidance behaviours that have been negatively reinforced in the 
past by reducing distress.
Whilst the hypothesis that worry functions as a means of cognitive avoidance has 
received experimental support (e.g. Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec & Inz, 1990; 
Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Diehl, 1993; Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986), there has 
been no corresponding research conducted into whether rumination also functions in 
this way. However, given that both rumination and worry are forms of abstract verbal 
thought, which has been shown in the case of worry to suppress somatic responses to 
aversive images (e.g. Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec et al., 1993; Vrana et al., 1986), 
it is plausible that rumination, like worry, is also negatively reinforced by its capacity to 
diminish such somatic responses. Whilst this model has not received any experimental 
attention with regards to rumination, it has a great deal of clinical utility, in that it
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encourages clinicians to determine the functions and consequences of rumination for 
each individual client through conducting a functional analysis.
3.5.4. Meta-Cognitive Account (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001)
Wells and Matthews (1994) proposed a meta-cognitive model of emotional disorders, in 
which perseverative negative thinking, such as rumination and worry, is maintained by 
meta-cognitive beliefs about the functions and consequences of such thinking 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). In this model, rumination is hypothesised to be 
underpinned by both positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs. Positive meta- 
cognitive beliefs about rumination (e.g. “rumination will help me understand my 
situation better”) are proposed to increase the likelihood that individuals will adopt 
rumination as a means of coping with their low mood. However, once rumination has 
begun, negative meta-cognitive beliefs about rumination (e.g. “I can’t control my 
rumination”) also arise, which is hypothesised to lead to rumination about rumination 
and increased negative mood.
In support of this model, Papageorgiou and Wells (2001) found that depressed 
participants reported both positive and negative beliefs about rumination. The 
advantages they gave for rumination, such as to find answers to their depression, to 
understand past mistakes and failures, and to find causes for their depression, all 
reflected themes concerning the use of rumination as a coping strategy. The
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disadvantages of rumination reflected themes of uncontrollability and harm and 
negative interpersonal consequences of rumination. In addition, Watkins and Baracaia
(2001) found that high levels of self-reported rumination were correlated with high 
levels of endorsements of the advantages of rumination. Similarly, Papageorgiou and 
Wells (2003) found that both positive and negative beliefs about rumination were 
significantly positively correlated with both rumination and depression. However, these 
studies have utilised small sample sizes and have not demonstrated a causal role for 
meta-cognitive beliefs in rumination.
3.6. Summary
Since the advent of Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) Response Styles Theory, a great deal of 
research has been conducted into the role of rumination in depression. This research has 
found that the presence of a ruminative response style predicts the onset, severity and 
duration of depressive episodes (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow 
1991a; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Experimental 
studies have also demonstrated that compared to distraction, rumination increases 
dysphoric mood (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 
1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), cognitive distortions and negative thinking 
(e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), accessibility 
of negative autobiographical memories (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Pyszczynski et al., 
1989), and interferes with effective interpersonal problem solving (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002).
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However, recent evidence (e.g. Bagby & Parker, 2001; Treynor et al., 2003; Watkins, 
2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) suggests that the consequences of rumination in 
depression depend upon the specific form it takes. In particular, the work by Watkins 
(e.g. Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) indicates that an abstract or “why” 
form of rumination inhibits emotional processing and effective interpersonal problem 
solving, whilst an experiential or “how” form of rumination enhances these processes. 
Several models have been put forward to explain why people engage in depressive 
rumination, and they have all received some degree of experimental support, which 
makes it difficult to make decisions about their respective validity. However, these 
models may represent different levels of explanation and, as such, may not be mutually 
exclusive. For example, both the developmental and meta-cognitive accounts attempt to 
explain why rumination develops, whilst the goal discrepancy and behavioural 
activation accounts discuss the possible mechanisms through which rumination is 
maintained.
4. Angry Rumination
4.1. Anger and Angry Rumination
Despite it being a central feature of human existence, we know little about anger 
compared to the extensive knowledge that has been accumulated on other emotions, 
such as anxiety and sadness (Norlander & Eckhardt, 2005). Anger is under-researched 
and often not well defined in research literature (DiGiuseppe, Tafrate & Eckhardt, 1994;
31
Eckhardt, Barbour & Stuart, 1997; Eckhardt & Deffenbacher, 1995). The dearth of 
research into anger partly reflects the difficulty in studying people with anger problems, 
in that whilst anger is included as a symptom of several DSM-IV disorders (Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual -  Fourth Edition; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), such 
as Borderline Personality Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, there are no 
formal diagnostic categories for defining an ‘anger problem’, nor are there any accepted 
criteria for studying people with ‘anger disorders’ (Eckhardt & Deffenbacher, 1995; 
Novaco, 1985). Also, due to ethical constraints, researchers are limited in the extent 
they can make participants angry in controlled laboratory conditions (Baumeister, 
Stillwell & Wotman, 1990). As a result, the quality and quantity of basic research on 
anger has been lacking despite a clear need to understand the causes and consequences 
of anger. In terms of its clinical relevance, Edmondson and Conger (1996) have 
reported that clients seeking therapy often present with angry feelings as a part of their 
clinical picture. Also, anger problems frequently cause concern because of their links to 
aggressive and violent impulses and acts (Howells, 1998; Novaco, 1997). In addition, 
anger has been associated with impaired physiological functioning and cardiovascular 
damage (e.g. Blascovich & Katkin, 1993; Siegman, 1994).
Angry rumination is generally considered to be a relatively independent component of 
the broader anger phenomenology (Sukhodolsky, Golub & Cromwell, 2001). 
Sukhodolsky et al. (2001) defined angry rumination as the tendency to engage in 
unintentional reoccurring thoughts about anger episodes. They concluded that the 
construct of angry rumination included three different processes: memories of past
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anger episodes, attention to immediate anger-provoking experiences, and counterfactual 
thinking about anger events. Counterfactual thinking refers to thought content that is at 
variance with actual events, such as thinking that an anger experience should not have 
happened (Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). Angry rumination, like anger, has 
received very little experimental attention, despite the fact that it has been implicated in 
the maintenance of anger-control problems (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977; Novaco, 1975). 
Also, rumination on anger experiences and the associated emotion has been linked to 
the development of aggression (Averill, 1983; Spielberger, 1988).
Despite this hypothesised link between angry rumination and anger-control problems, 
not much is known about the nature, process, functions or consequences of angry 
rumination. In the literature, rumination has largely been treated as a unitary concept 
that occurs across a range of psychological disorders, such as depression, anxiety, and 
anger (e.g. Ingram, 1990; Watkins, 2003; Wells & Matthews, 1994), and little attention 
has been paid to whether rumination functions in the same way across these different 
disorders. However, as most of the research into rumination has been conducted in the 
context of a depressed mood, it is difficult to know whether the findings are applicable 
to rumination in the context of other mood states or whether they are only specific to 
rumination in depression. The following two sections of this paper will explore whether 
rumination in the context of an angry mood functions in the same way as in a depressed 
mood, and whether the findings from the depressive rumination literature can be applied 
to anger.
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4.2. Theories that Suggest a Similar Role for Angry and Depressive Rumination
Given that rumination has been regarded as occurring uniformly across a range of 
negative moods, angry rumination might be expected to have similar functions and 
consequences to depressive rumination. In particular, it might be predicted that angry 
rumination would lead to similar negative consequences for mood, thinking and 
interpersonal problem solving that have been found to result from depressive 
rumination. In order to explore these possibilities, literature that suggests a similar role 
and consequences for angry and depressive rumination will be discussed below.
4.2,1. Associative Network Account
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) argued that associative network theories predict 
that any type of mood state activates mood-congruent cognitions and memories, which 
prolong or increase the mood. Rumination on the negative mood is hypothesised to 
enhance spreading activation in the associative network, thus exacerbating the negative 
mood. In contrast, distraction is believed to interrupt spreading activation, thereby 
allowing the emotion to abate. Therefore, according to associative network theories, the 
pattern of effects that rumination and distraction has on anger should be the same as 
their effects on depression. In particular, rumination in the context of an angry mood 
should enhance and prolong anger state in the same way that depressive rumination 
increases and maintains depressed mood. Studies of anger based upon the associative 
network approach have generated some evidence for the first part of this account, in that
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they have found that angry mood does indeed lead to an increased availability of angry 
thoughts and memories (Laird, Cuniff, Sheehan, Shulman & Strum, 1989; Laird, 
Wagener, Halal & Szegda, 1982; Nasby & Yando, 1982). For example, Nasby and 
Yando (1982) found that an angry mood facilitated the processing of emotionally 
upsetting material and inhibited the processing of pleasant material. Given that angry 
mood has been found to increase the accessibility of angry thoughts and memories, 
anything that focuses attention on the angry mood, such as rumination, should enhance 
this process, thus resulting in more intense and prolonged anger.
Therefore, according to the associative network account, rumination in the context of an 
angry mood may function in a similar way to depressive rumination, in that they both 
involve focusing attention on the negative mood and the causes and consequences of the 
negative mood, which is hypothesised to result in the prolongation of the mood (Rusting 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) also argued that 
anger-prone individuals may be especially likely to ruminate in response to angry 
events, and that this rumination is likely to strengthen angry associations in memory, 
which might enhance their predisposition to experience further anger, thus setting up a 
vicious cycle that is difficult to escape. It is also possible that, like depressive 
rumination, angry rumination directs the individual’s attention to the products of 
spreading activation (i.e. angry memories and thoughts) and allows them to influence 
the individual’s judgment and behaviour. If this were the case, angry rumination would 
be expected to increase biased or distorted thinking and to interfere with effective
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interpersonal problem solving, as has been found to be the case with depressive 
rumination.
Biased or Distorted Thinking:
Problems with excessive levels of anger have been theoretically and empirically linked 
to the presence of cognitive distortions (e.g. Beck, 1976; Berkowitz, 1993; Eckhardt & 
Deffenbacher, 1995; Ellis, 1977). Numerous studies have found a moderate but 
significant overlap in measures of self-reported anger and irrational ideation across a 
range of participants, such as undergraduates, violent prisoners, and clinical outpatients 
(e.g. Ford, 1990; Hazaleus & Deffenbacher, 1985; Kassinove & Eckhardt, 1994; Mizes, 
Morgan & Buder, 1990; Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984). Cognitive distortions have 
also been studied in maritally violent men. For example, Holtzworth-Munroe and 
Hutchinson (1993) found that maritally violent men were more likely than non-violent 
controls to attribute the cause of hypothetical marital conflicts to the hostile intentions 
of their wives. In addition, Eckhardt, Barbour and Davison (1998) found that, when 
angered, maritally violent men emitted significantly more total irrational beliefs and 
demandingness statements than non-violent controls. They also articulated significantly 
more cognitive distortions, such as overgeneralisation, dichotomous thinking, arbitrary 
inference and magnification. These results were replicated by Eckhardt and Jamison
(2002) with men who engaged in dating violence. Also, these studies found that the 
cognitive distortions were only apparent when the participants were angered. This is 
consistent with associative network theories, in which anger arousal is necessary in 
order to activate cognitive networks. Whilst unproven, it is possible that, like depressive
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rumination, angry rumination may enhance the effects of angry mood on thinking, in 
that it may draw the individual’s attention to the angry and distorted cognitions and 
allow them to affect the individual’s judgment and interpretation of current events.
Interpersonal Problem Solving:
Numerous studies have found evidence of a link between both anger and aggression and 
deficiencies in interpersonal problem solving. For example, aggressive children and 
adolescents have been found to generate fewer alternative solutions to interpersonal 
problems compared to their more pro-social peers, and the solutions they produce are 
more aggressive and less effective (e.g. Asamow & Callan, 1985; Lochman & 
Lampron, 1986; Richard & Dodge, 1982). Several studies have also found evidence for 
this link in adults (e.g. Basquill, Nezu, Nezu, & Klein, 2004; D’Zurilla, Chang & Sanna, 
2003; McMurran, Blair & Egan, 2002; Tescher, Conger, Edmondson & Conger, 1999). 
For example, D’Zurilla et al. (2003) found that amongst college students poor social 
problem solving was a significant predictor of subsequent aggression. Also, all three 
dysfunctional problem solving dimensions on the SPSI-R (Social Problem-Solving 
Inventory-Revised; D’Zurilla, Nezu & Maydeu-Olivares, 2001) were positively 
correlated with both anger and hostility. In addition, Tescher et al. (1999) found that 
high-anger prone participants had poorer social skills than low anger prone individuals. 
Similarly, numerous studies have demonstrated that maritally violent men have deficits 
in interpersonal problem solving. For example, Holtzworth-Munroe and Anglin (1991) 
found that maritally violent men offered the fewest competent solutions compared to 
control groups for hypothetical conflict situations. Also, Dutton and Browning (1988)
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found that maritally violent men’s coping responses involved less constructive 
reasoning and more verbal and physical aggression than controls. Finally, Eckhardt and 
Kassinove (1998) found that maritally violent men were significantly less likely than 
non-violent men to spontaneously articulate anger-controlling statements during anger 
arousal.
Given these findings, it is possible that rumination in the context of an angry mood may 
have a role to play in interfering with effective interpersonal problem solving. It is 
possible to hypothesise that, like depressive rumination, the effects of angry rumination 
on thinking (i.e. increased accessibility of angry, distorted cognitions) may bias the 
individual’s interpretation of current events and impair their ability to generate effective 
solutions to their problems. Incorporating the findings from above, angry rumination 
may decrease the likelihood that individuals will use anger-controlling statements, 
interfere with their ability to generate competent solutions to their problems, and 
increase the likelihood of their choosing an aggressive response.
4.2.2. Theories that are Consistent with the Associative Network Account
Several other theories make predictions about the consequences of angry rumination 
that are consistent with those of the associative network account. In particular, they 
propose that angry rumination enhances and maintains anger state. For example, Tice 
and Baumeister (1993) argued that if a person focuses their attention on the anger 
provoking event, it may be relatively easy to control their anger. However, if the
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individual ruminates, they may uncover additional implications to the offence and recall 
similar past grievances, which may help to place the incident in a broader context of 
injustice. This provides the individual with more information to dwell on and it 
increases the likelihood that anger will be prolonged and enhanced. In support of this, 
Baumeister et al. (1990) found that angry people link anger experiences into more 
lasting associative networks compared to the people who offended them, in that angry 
victims’ accounts of anger events involved multiple provocations, long-term negative 
consequences, relationship damage and other signs of the event being connected to 
broader contexts. Also consistent with the associative network account, Sukhodolsky et 
al. (2001) proposed that the three processes that comprise angry rumination (i.e. 
memories of past anger episodes, attention to immediate anger-provoking experiences, 
and counterfactual thinking about anger events) function to maintain and augment 
anger. In particular, they argued that memories of past anger episodes trigger new 
episodes of anger, attention to anger experiences amplifies its intensity and duration, 
and counterfactual thinking increases action tendencies towards resolution or retaliation. 
They hypothesised that following an initial provocation, the individual’s attention and 
thinking will be continuously focused on, or will frequently return to, the anger 
provoking event, which will enhance and prolong the anger experience and exacerbate 
the possible negative consequences of anger.
In addition, two recent models of aggression appear to include a process similar to 
angry rumination, which they propose leads to increased anger and potential for 
aggression. In Beck’s (1999) model, aggression is believed to be the result of a
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particular style of cognitive processing, in which the individual is preoccupied with 
perceived past and current injustices and threats to the self. Further, he hypothesised 
that the individual’s interpretation of an event as representing a violation of an 
important personal rule will activate memories of prior violations in similar contexts, 
which may further increase affective arousal. This appears to be consistent with other 
conceptualisations of angry rumination as involving the activation of memories of past 
angry experiences, which results in an increase in angry mood (e.g. Sukhodolsky et al., 
2001). Similarly, Anderson and Bushman’s (2002) theory of aggression seems to 
include a process analogous to angry rumination. They posit the existence of a 
reappraisal process that may occur after the initial appraisal of the anger-provoking 
event. They describe this reappraisal process as involving a search for an alternative 
view of the situation, which may include a search for relevant memories and 
information about the cause of the event. They hypothesised that this may lead to an 
increase in anger as the individual remembers past wrongs and as the damage the anger- 
provoking event has done to their social image becomes clear. This reappraisal process 
seems comparable to other definitions of angry rumination, in that the search for causes 
appears similar to Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) definition of rumination, and the search 
for relevant memories seems consistent with Sukhodolsky et al.’s (2001) 
conceptualisation of angry rumination. Therefore, in both of these models of aggression, 
a process that appears to be analogous to rumination is hypothesised to lead to an 
increase in anger and aggression.
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4.2.3. Meta-cognitive Account
Finally, Wells and Matthews’ (1994) model treats rumination uniformly across the 
emotional disorders and would therefore posit a similar role for rumination in the 
context of an angry mood as for rumination in the context of a depressed mood. In this 
model, perseverative negative processing, such as rumination and worry, is seen as 
crucial to the maintenance of emotional disorders because it nurtures intrusive thinking, 
triggers negative thoughts, increases self-focused processing, and primes attention to 
mood relevant material (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003). Rumination is hypothesised 
to be sustained by both positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs about its functions 
and consequences. Therefore, this model would predict that, like depressed people, 
angry individuals would have both positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs about 
rumination and that rumination would maintain their anger problem by the processes 
described above (i.e. nurturing intrusive thinking etc.).
4.2.4. Summary
Both the associative network and meta-cognitive accounts argue that depressive and 
angry rumination function in a similar way. For example, the associative network 
account predicts that, as with depressive rumination, angry rumination results in an 
increase in the intensity and duration of anger state experience. This conclusion has also 
been reached by several other theorists (e.g. Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Beck, 1999; 
Sukhodolsky et al., 2001; Tice & Baumeister, 1993). Also, given the research indicating
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that cognitive distortions and deficits in interpersonal problem solving are a feature of 
individuals with anger control problems (e.g. D’Zurilla et al., 2003; Eckhardt & 
Deffenbacher, 1995; Tescher et al., 1999), it has been argued here that angry rumination 
may function in a similar way to depressive rumination, in that it may bring distorted 
cognitions to the individual’s attention and allow them to interfere with their judgment 
and ability to solve social problems. Therefore, from the literature described above, it 
seems reasonable to predict that, like depressive rumination, angry rumination 
exacerbates angry mood, increases negative thinking and interferes with effective 
interpersonal problem solving. Literature that suggests an opposing viewpoint (i.e. that 
angry and depressive rumination have different functions and consequences) will be 
presented in the following section.
4.3. Theories that Suggest a Different Role for Angry and Depressive Rumination
Differential-emotions theories (e.g. Ekman, Friesen & Ancoli, 1980; Izard, 1977) 
propose that each emotion has a unique pattern of expression and activation. As such, 
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) argued that different emotions may require 
different emotion regulation strategies. Therefore, these theories raise the question as to 
whether rumination and distraction operate differently in different emotions, such as 
anger and sadness. In order to attempt to answer this question, literature that suggests 
how anger differs from other negative moods will be presented first. Then, the ways in 
which these differences may impact upon the role that rumination plays in anger 
compared to the role it plays in depression will be discussed.
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4.3.1. How Anger May Differ from Other Negative Emotions
Self-justification:
One possible way that anger differs from other negative emotions is self-justification. 
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) argued that anger, unlike sadness or anxiety, is 
more likely to involve attributions of blame to others (e.g. Averill, 1982, 1983; Frijda,
1986). Averill (1983) described anger as an accusation, which results from an appraisal 
of some deliberate, negligent or at least avoidable transgression. In support of this, 
Averill (1983) found that over 85% of anger episodes involved either an act the person 
considered voluntary and unjustified or a potentially avoidable accident. Therefore, as 
anger involves perceived injustice and blame of others, there is an element of self­
justification in anger that is unlikely to be present in anxiety or sadness. Rusting and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) proposed that this means that people are more likely to feel 
that they have a right to be angry than they have a right to be sad or anxious. 
Baumeister et al. (1990) found support for this, in that they found that angry people 
often argued that the other person was wrong and that their own feelings of anger were 
justified. Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) hypothesised that because of such self- 
justification anger may be more difficult to disengage from using distraction than is the 
case for anxiety or sadness. There is some evidence to support this hypothesis, in that 
Tice (1990, cited in Tice & Baumeister (1993)) found that people had fewer successful 
strategies for controlling anger compared to other negative emotions. However, Zillman 
and his colleagues have found that distraction can be successful in reducing anger when
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people engage in highly absorbing and entertaining activities (e.g. Zillman, 1988; 
Zillman, Hezel & Medoff, 1980). Whilst Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) did not 
discuss rumination in relation to self-justification, it is possible to hypothesise that 
because people feel they have a right to be angry they may be motivated to engage in 
angry rumination as a means of analysing the other person’s culpability and vindicating 
themselves.
The Utility o f Anger:
Another way in which anger may be different from other negative emotions is its ability 
to enable people to achieve positive goals in their life. There is evidence that suggests 
that people believe anger can have useful and desirable functions (e.g. Averill, 1982; 
Tarvis, 1989). In Averill’s (1983) survey, participants reported three times more 
beneficial than harmful consequences of anger. Also, current theoretical 
conceptualisations of anger (e.g. Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Power & Dalgleish, 
1999) describe it as a fundamentally goal-oriented emotion. In these models, anger is 
triggered by obstacles to personal goal attainment and is often functional in removing 
these obstacles (Berkowitz, 1999; Stein & Levine, 1999). Similarly, Robins and Novaco 
(1999) described anger as both a cue that something needs to change and a means of 
changing it. In support of this, Averill (1982) found that frustration or the interruption 
of some ongoing or planned activity was the most frequently mentioned precipitant for 
anger. Also, Thompson and Kolstoe (1973) found that frustration led to an increase in 
aggression when participants were close to their goal and when aggression could help 
overcome the frustration. Whilst these theories do not explicitly mention angry
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rumination, it is possible to hypothesise that a role for angry rumination exists. Given 
that the goal-oriented theories of anger seem similar to the goal discrepancy account of 
rumination (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg,
1987), it may be the case that angry rumination is the mechanism through which anger 
enables people to attain important goals. In particular, as has been proposed by the goal 
discrepancy account of rumination, angry rumination may be prompted by disruptions 
in goal progress and function to keep the individual’s attention focused on the 
discrepancy between their current state and the goal state, which, in turn, keeps them on 
track in pursuit of their goals.
What sorts of goals may anger and aggression be enabling the person to achieve? Tice 
and Baumeister (1993) argued that one potential beneficial consequence of anger is that 
it can facilitate making important changes in one’s environment. They proposed that 
people may need to become angry in order to make positive changes in their life, such 
as confronting someone who has been treating them badly. Also, Bushman and 
Anderson (2001) argued against the utility of the angry aggression versus instrumental 
aggression dichotomy and maintained instead that most aggression involves mixed 
motives (i.e. both angry and instrumental motives). They proposed that some of the 
goals of aggression are: to re-establish self-esteem or public image, to express 
grievances or right a wrong, and to obtain material benefits, such as money (Tedeschi & 
Felson, 1994). Therefore, both anger and its expression may facilitate the achievement 
of a range of social and other goals (Robins & Novaco, 1999).
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In terms of social benefits, it is clear that anger can confer social status in a way that is 
unlikely to be true for other negative emotions. Clark, Pataki and Carver (1996) argued 
that expressions of anger represent an intimidation strategy and create the impression 
that the expressor is strong and that others should comply. However, Tiedens (2001) 
argued that expressions of anger would be unlikely to remain effective in the long-run if 
they only worked through intimidation. She hypothesised that in order for anger to be a 
durable social influence strategy, it must also indicate that the expressor is to be valued 
and respected. Several studies have found evidence to support this hypothesis. People 
expressing anger are seen as dominant, strong, competent and smart, but also less 
friendly and warm (Clark et al., 1996; Labott, Martin, Eason & Berkey, 1991). Another 
study found that people rated individuals with angry facial expressions as occupying 
more powerful social positions than individuals with sad expressions (Keating, 1985). 
Similarly, Tiedens, Ellsworth and Mesquita (2000) demonstrated that participants rated 
the angry character in a vignette as high status and the sad character as low status. 
Finally, Tiedens (2001) found that anger expressions created the impression that the 
expressor was competent, and status was conferred on the basis of perceived 
competence. Although the angry expressors were also seen as less likeable, likeability 
was not related to status conferral. She interpreted these results as indicating that anger 
displays may be effective in attaining social status.
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4.3.2. The Role of Rumination
Given that people believe that anger can have useful and desirable functions, they may 
try to produce or prolong angry mood states. Tice and Baumeister (1993) hypothesised 
that individuals may try to maintain their anger, in order to enable them to do things that 
they would find difficult to do if they were not angry. They also described a mechanism 
through which such anger may be maintained. They argued that whilst people 
experience a range of anger-provoking events, they will typically view these events as 
isolated incidents, which keeps their anger at a low level. However, they contend that 
many major life changes begin with the individual assembling all of the anger- 
provoking events into what appears to be a recurrent pattern. Further, they argue that 
preserving anger across individual episodes may facilitate people discovering these 
broad patterns, which, in turn, enable them to make large-scale changes in their life. In 
support of this, Tice (1990, cited in Tice & Baumeister, 1993) found that compared to 
other negative mood states, participants were somewhat less likely to report trying to 
generate a state of anger, but they were more likely to report trying to prolong an angry 
mood. The primary method used to sustain the angry mood over long periods of time 
was “rehearsing the cognitive and experiential basis for it, such as brooding about one’s 
grievance” (Tice & Baumeister, 1993, p. 402). Therefore, this study found that people 
often report trying to prolong their angry mood, and the primary method they use to do 
this is angry rumination. Taken together, Tice and Baumeister’s (1993) theoretical 
account and the findings from this study seem to suggest that angry rumination is the
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mechanism through which people maintain their anger to enable them to make changes 
in their life and achieve the social and other goals described above.
Further support for this account was found by O’Neal and Taylor, who demonstrated 
that people do try to prolong their angry moods, but only when it is useful to do so 
(O’Neal & Taylor, 1989; Taylor, 1992). In particular, O’Neal and Taylor (1989) found 
that angered participants who expected the opportunity to retaliate against the person 
who provoked them were more interested in viewing violent videos than both non­
angered controls and angered participants who did not expect an opportunity to 
retaliate. These findings suggest that participants chose materials that would help 
perpetuate a useful emotional state. Similarly, Taylor (1992) found that angered 
participants who anticipated the opportunity to retaliate against the person who 
provoked them recalled more negative words than other participants, and recalled more 
negative words than positive or neutral words. This was not true for angered 
participants who did not expect the opportunity to retaliate. These results were 
interpreted as indicating that participants selectively recalled negative items only when 
it was useful to perpetuate an angry mood. It is possible that rumination may facilitate 
or underscore this process of selectively recalling anger-relevant material when it is 
advantageous to maintain an angry mood.
In addition to making positive changes in one’s life and attaining important goals, angry 
rumination may serve other positive functions. In the Tice (1990, cited in Tice & 
Baumeister, 1993) study, one of the strategies that people reported using to cope with
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their angry mood was to try to understand the behaviour of the person who offended 
them. It could be argued that this is analogous to angry rumination, as one of the four 
factors on the Anger Rumination Scale (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) is ‘understanding the 
causes of the anger event’. Despite the fact that this strategy involves focusing on the 
anger-provoking event, people sometimes reported that it was an effective means of 
controlling their anger. Baumeister et al. (1990) argued that anger is often characterised 
by an inability to understand that the other person had an acceptable reason for acting as 
they did. Angry people tend to report that the offender’s intentions are unclear, 
incoherent, unreasonable or otherwise opaque or they view the offender as being 
motivated by malice because they are unable to see any decent reason for their 
behaviour (Tice & Baumeister, 1993). However, offenders do not see themselves in this 
way and are usually able to come up with a reasonable explanation for their actions. In 
this way, Baumeister et al. (1990) hypothesised that anger is characterised by a gap in 
interpersonal understanding, in which one person is not able to comprehend the other’s 
intentions. Therefore, Tice and Baumeister (1993) argued that attempts to try and 
understand the offender’s intentions (i.e. rumination) may help to bridge this gap in 
interpersonal understanding.
Also, Tice and Baumeister (1993) argued that whilst anger typically involves expressing 
disapproval of another’s actions, the expression of anger itself is often subject to 
disapproval in society. Therefore, they proposed that both the offender and the angry 
person may feel pressure to justify themselves. They argued that because society tends 
to consider anger more appropriate when the offence is more severe, the angry person
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may try to justify their angry response by exaggerating the severity of the offence. Tice 
and Baumeister (1993) interpreted the results of the Baumeister et al. (1990) study as 
providing evidence for this hypothesis, in that angry people were found to describe 
angry events in more long-term contexts and as having more negative enduring 
consequences. Whilst Tice and Baumeister (1993) did not address rumination here, it is 
possible that angry rumination may function in this way, i.e. to aid the person in 
justifying their angry expression by exaggerating the severity of the provocation.
4.3.3. Summary
One possible difference between how the mood regulation strategies function in anger 
compared to other negative moods was suggested by Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1998). They argued that because anger, unlike sadness and anxiety, involves self­
justification and blame of others, people may be more reluctant to disengage from their 
anger. Other theorists have argued that anger, unlike other negative emotions, can have 
useful and desirable functions, such as enabling people to make large-scale changes in 
their life, achieve important goals and gain social status (e.g. Bushman & Anderson, 
2001; Tice & Baumeister, 1993; Tiedens, 2001). Further, Tice and Baumeister (1993) 
hypothesised that people may try to maintain their anger in order to achieve these 
positive changes. Whilst the theory and evidence relating to anger’s potential to 
facilitate the realisation of social and other goals does not specifically mention a role for 
rumination, Tice (1990, cited in Tice & Baumeister, 1993) found that the method people 
used to prolong their anger state was to brood on one’s grievances, which can be seen to
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be analogous to rumination. Therefore, this account proposes very different functions 
and consequences for rumination in the context of an angry mood than has been found 
for rumination in the context of a depressed mood. According to this account, 
individuals may engage in angry rumination to help perpetuate an angry mood, in order 
to enable them to achieve a range of positive goals. The next section will review the 
research that has been conducted on angry rumination thus far and will discuss these 
findings in light of the two opposing accounts of the functions and consequences of 
angry rumination that have been presented here.
4.4. A Review of the Experimental Research on Angry Rumination
Angry rumination has been the subject of a small amount of experimental attention. The 
few studies that have been conducted appear to support the associative network account 
of rumination. The main findings from these studies will be reported below.
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1998) study probably represents the most direct test of 
whether rumination and distraction lead to similar consequences in the context of an 
angry mood to those found in a depressed mood. They found that participants who 
ruminated following an angry mood induction exhibited an increase in angry mood, 
whereas those who distracted did not show this increase. Distraction either had no effect 
on participants’ angry mood or it led to a decrease in anger. Therefore, these findings 
suggest that rumination in the context of an angry mood operates in much the same way 
as rumination in the context of a depressed mood. The results also support the
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associative network account of rumination, especially as participants in the rumination 
condition were found to have produced more negative beliefs, memories and events in 
the stories they wrote in response to an emotionally ambiguous sentence.
A number of other studies have examined the impact of rumination and distraction on 
anger and aggression. For example, Bushman (2002) investigated the effects of venting 
anger on aggression. He found that participants who ruminated about the person who 
provoked them whilst hitting a punching bag had higher levels of anger and aggression 
than those who distracted. Another study found that rumination increased aggression 
after a minor triggering event (Bushman, Pedersen, Vasquez, Bonacci & Miller, 2001, 
cited in Bushman, 2002). In this study, participants who had been provoked were either 
asked to focus their attention on or away from their negative mood. Later on, they were 
given the opportunity to engage in displaced aggression towards a competent or 
fumbling confederate. They found that provoked participants who had ruminated 
engaged in more displaced aggression towards the fumbling participant than did 
participants who distracted away from their negative mood. In the field of sports 
psychology, Maxwell (2004) found that aggression level correlated positively with 
scores on the ARS (Anger Rumination Scale; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). Also, Konecni 
(1974) found that aggression towards an insulting confederate was reduced by having 
people solve math problems. This result was interpreted as indicating that the math 
problems functioned as a means of distracting participants’ attention away from their 
anger. Taken together, these studies suggest that rumination on anger or the source of 
their provocation led to enhanced anger and aggression, whilst distraction led to a
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reduction in anger and aggression. Therefore, these findings are consistent with the 
associative network account of rumination.
Linden et al. (2003) found a moderately high correlation between rumination (as 
measured by the BARQ (Behavioural Anger Response Questionnaire)) and trait anger. 
From this result, they concluded that individuals with high trait anger may possess a set 
of repetitious thought patterns (i.e. angry rumination), which themselves are likely to 
predispose these individuals to greater subsequent anger responses (Earle, Linden & 
Weinberg, 1999). This conclusion appears very similar to Rusting and Nolen- 
Hoeksema’s (1998) hypothesis regarding the role of angry rumination amongst anger- 
prone individuals (i.e. that it may strengthen angry associations in memory and increase 
their predisposition to experience anger). Linden et al. (2003) also found a small but 
consistent correlation between rumination and aggressive anger-out, which they 
interpreted as indicating that rumination, by maintaining the individual’s attentional 
focus on past anger feelings, will lead to more readily experienced and more 
aggressively expressed anger when faced with a new provocation.
Finally, Simpson and Papageorgiou (2003) found evidence to support the meta- 
cognitive account of rumination, in that they demonstrated that people with anger 
control problems hold both positive and negative meta-cognitive beliefs about angry 
rumination. The negative beliefs that angry participants reported were similar to those 
that have been found amongst depressive ruminators. They included rumination 
heightening angry mood and interfering with functioning and interpersonal situations.
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The positive beliefs that participants endorsed were also very similar to those that have 
been found in the depressive literature. The positive beliefs involved rumination helping 
them to prepare for similar situations in the future, gain insight and understanding into 
their problems, and justify their response to the anger eliciting situation. This last 
positive belief (i.e. justifying their response) seems similar to the hypothesis made by 
Tice and Baumeister (1993) that people may exaggerate the severity of an offence to 
justify their angry response. It was proposed in this paper that angry rumination may 
function to underpin this exaggeration process, which appears to have been borne out by 
this study. However, this study utilised an extremely small sample size (i.e. ten people), 
so the reliability and validity of its results must be interpreted with caution.
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
A review of the research that has been conducted on angry rumination seems to support 
the notion that angry and depressive rumination function in a similar way. In particular, 
like depressive rumination, angry rumination has been found to increase anger and 
aggression (e.g. Bushman 2002; Bushman et al., 2001; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998). These results are also consistent with spreading activation or associative network 
theories. However, there is also some tentative evidence supporting the meta-cognitive 
account of rumination (i.e. Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003), which also posits a similar 
role for both angry and depressive rumination. Whilst the evidence presented above 
suggests that angry and depressive rumination function in a similar manner, there may 
be reason to remain sceptical at this stage. In particular, as only a small number of
54
studies have been carried out on angry rumination, these conclusions are fairly tentative. 
More research needs to be carried out in order to feel more assured that angry 
rumination has similar functions and consequences to those of depressive rumination.
In particular, more research that is guided by associative network theories needs to be 
conducted on angry rumination. According to these theories, any negative mood primes 
mood-congruent material, such as memories and thoughts. Also, rumination in the 
context of any negative mood is hypothesised to make these mood-congruent thoughts 
and memories more accessible. If these theories are correct, angry rumination, like 
depressive rumination, would be expected to lead to enhanced accessibility of angry 
memories, increased distorted/biased thinking and impaired interpersonal problem 
solving. Therefore, research needs to be carried out to determine the consequences of 
angry rumination on memory, cognition and interpersonal problem solving. Also, it is 
not clear at this stage whether a tendency towards ruminating in response to angry 
moods predicts the onset and maintenance of angry episodes or anger problems. 
Therefore, prospective studies are needed to elucidate whether angry rumination 
predicts the onset, severity and duration of angry episodes, as has been found to be the 
case for depressive rumination.
In addition, given Watkins’ (e.g. Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002) more 
recent findings relating to depressive rumination, more attention needs to be paid to the 
precise manner in which people attend to their anger episodes. It may be the case that 
the consequences for both angry and depressive rumination depend upon the styles of
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rumination, with different styles having different outcomes for emotional processing 
and interpersonal problem solving. Also, given the research described earlier by O’Neal 
and Taylor (i.e. O’Neal & Taylor, 1989; Taylor, 1992), it seems important to consider 
the context in which angry rumination occurs, in that the consequences of angry 
rumination may depend on how useful it is to perpetuate an angry mood. It is possible 
that angry rumination may lead to positive outcomes in certain contexts. For example, 
the literature presented earlier suggests that it may be useful to prolong an angry mood 
in order to: facilitate making changes in one’s environment (e.g. to help bring someone 
to the point at which they can communicate their dissatisfaction), overcome obstacles to 
one’s goals, or achieve social status.
Until more basic research is conducted into angry rumination, it is difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions regarding its functions and consequences and whether they are similar 
or different to those of depressive rumination. In addition to helping redress the 
imbalance in accumulated knowledge between anger and other negative emotions and 
shedding light on this important aspect of human experience, this research would 
potentially have significant clinical implications. Currently, rumination is regarded as a 
unitary concept that functions similarly across all negative emotions, and as such it has 
been proposed as an effective means of combating co-morbidity (e.g. Watkins, 2003). 
However, unless more research is conducted to determine whether this 
conceptualisation is valid, treatments based on this notion may not be effective when 
they are applied to non-depressive disorders, such as anger problems.
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Part 2: Empirical Paper
Cognitive Flexibility amongst Angry Ruminators and the Effects of 
Angry Rumination on Interpersonal Problem Solving
79
1. Abstract
Depressive rumination has been found to be associated with an inflexible and 
perseverative cognitive style (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and lead to impairments 
in effective interpersonal problem solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell & Berg, 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). The aim of 
this study was to explore whether this was also true for angry rumination. Study 1 
employed a correlational design and examined the relationships between cognitive 
flexibility, trait angry rumination and interpersonal problem solving. Study 2 was 
experimental and aimed to explore the impact of state angry rumination on interpersonal 
problem solving by inducing anger and rumination and distraction, and measuring its 
impact on interpersonal problem solving. The results of study 1 indicated that cognitive 
flexibility was not related to trait angry rumination, but that both cognitive flexibility 
and trait angry rumination predicted interpersonal problem solving. Contrary to 
predictions, study 2 found that the rumination induction did not lead to less effective 
interpersonal problem solving compared to the distraction induction. However, further 
analyses with the addition of a cognitive flexibility factor (i.e. high versus low cognitive 
flexibility) showed that the rumination induction did result in less effective 
interpersonal problem solving, but only for those participants low on cognitive 
flexibility.
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2. Introduction
2.1. Rumination
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) defined rumination as thoughts and behaviours 
that focus an individual’s attention on a negative mood, the causes and consequences of 
this mood, and self-evaluations related to the mood. Numerous theorists have stressed 
the importance of rumination in emotional disorders. For example, both Teasdale and 
Barnard’s (1993) and Pyszcynski and Greenberg’s (1987) theories of depression 
highlighted the role of rumination. In addition, Wells and Matthews (1994) viewed 
rumination and worry as crucial to the maintenance of emotional disorders because of 
their role in triggering negative thoughts, increasing self-focused attention and priming 
attention to mood relevant material.
2.2. Depressive Rumination
Rumination has primarily been investigated within the context of a depressed mood and 
has been consistently implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. A number 
of prospective studies have found that a ruminative response style predicts the onset of 
depressive symptoms or episodes, the severity of depressive symptoms, and the 
duration of a depressive episode (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 1991, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker 
& Larson, 1994). For example, Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker and Larson (1994) found that
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bereaved people who tended to engage in a ruminative response style one-month after 
the bereavement were more severely depressed at six-months, even after controlling for 
initial depression levels, social support, stress and gender.
Experimental studies have also been conducted in which rumination is contrasted with 
another mood regulation strategy, distraction. In these studies, dysphoric and non­
dysphoric participants are induced to ruminate or distract. These studies have found 
that, compared to distraction, rumination increases dysphoric mood (Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), cognitive distortions and negative thinking (e.g. 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), and the 
accessibility of negative autobiographical memories (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; 
Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring & Greenberg, 1989).
Typically, these effects of rumination have been explained within associative networks 
or spreading activation theories of mood (e.g. Bower, 1981; Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 
1983). In these theories, emotions are hypothesised to organise information stored in 
semantic memory networks. Each emotion acts as a ‘central node’ that links together 
causally related information (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). When an emotion is 
triggered, associated information (e.g. thoughts, memories, action tendencies, and 
physiological responses) will be activated, thus prolonging or amplifying the emotion. 
Rumination on the negative emotion is hypothesised to enhance this spreading 
activation, whilst distraction interrupts it (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).
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2.2.1. Depressive Rumination and Interpersonal Problem Solving
As well as enhancing negative thinking, several studies have demonstrated that 
rumination also interferes with interpersonal problem solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). For example, 
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) found that dysphoric participants who were 
induced to ruminate generated less effective solutions to interpersonal problems than 
non-dysphoric participants or dysphoric participants induced to distract. They 
hypothesised that, whilst negative mood activates negative thinking, rumination brings 
these negative thoughts to the individual’s attention and allows them to interfere with 
their interpretations of current events, which, in turn, impairs their ability to find 
effective solutions to their problems. Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) found support for this 
conceptualisation, in that dysphoric ruminators’ negative biases in their thinking were 
shown to be related to the effectiveness of their social problem solving solutions. In 
particular, compared to dysphoric distractors and non-dysphoric controls, dysphoric 
ruminators rated their problems as more severe and less solvable, and they rated 
themselves as less likely to implement their solutions. Also, compared to the other 
groups, the content of their thoughts was more negative, problem-focused and self- 
blaming. As was found by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995), dysphoric 
ruminators produced significantly less effective solutions to hypothetical social problem 
scenarios on the Means Ends Problem Solving procedure (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 
1975). Finally, the effectiveness of solutions was found to be related to the content of 
participants thinking, in that it was significantly associated with diminished negative
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tone, less focusing on one’s problems and feelings, and less self-criticism, as well as 
increased self-confidence and perceived control.
2.2.2. Depressive Rumination and Cognitive Inflexibility
Given that rumination has been found to produce such negative outcomes, why do 
people continue to ruminate? Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) advanced one possible 
explanation for the maintenance of depressive rumination. They proposed that 
rumination may reflect a more general tendency towards cognitive inflexibility or 
perseveration. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) hypothesised that people who are 
cognitively inflexible may tend to ruminate when they are depressed because they have 
difficulty generating alternative ways of coping, and because it is difficult for them to 
switch their attention away from themselves and their problems. Therefore, they 
predicted that ruminators would exhibit deficits in their ability to abandon ineffective 
cognitive behaviour and have difficulty maintaining effective cognitive behaviour. In 
support of this hypothesis, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) found that ruminators 
committed more perseverative errors and failed to maintain set more often than non- 
ruminators on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948). These 
effects were independent of mood, general intelligence and other general cognitive 
functions (e.g. working memory, reasoning, and task switching). They interpreted these 
findings as suggesting that ruminators prematurely abandon adaptive cognitive sets, and 
have difficulty adjusting their cognitive sets to changing environmental contingencies, 
even when the adaptiveness of the set has been invalidated by negative feedback. 
Therefore, ruminators have difficulty inhibiting perseverative tendencies and
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maintaining adaptive tendencies. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) concluded that the 
tendency to ruminate when dysphoric may be a consequence of cognitive inflexibility 
and perseveration, in that people who cannot inhibit perseverative tendencies and who 
fail to maintain adaptive cognitive behaviour may become trapped in unproductive 
perseveration on negative moods and events. In addition, they hypothesised that this 
cognitive inflexibility may contribute to difficulties in interpersonal problem solving 
that help to perpetuate negative mood.
2.3. Angry Rumination
In contrast to the large amount of research conducted into depressive rumination, angry 
rumination has received very little experimental attention, despite the fact that it has 
been implicated in the maintenance of anger-control problems (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977; 
Novaco, 1975, 1979). Rumination over the causes of anger and the resultant affect has 
also been implicated in the development of aggression (Averill, 1983; Spielberger, 
1988). Sukhodolsky, Golub and Cromwell (2001) defined angry rumination as the 
tendency to engage in unintentional reoccurring thoughts about anger episodes. Several 
researchers have hypothesised that such rumination may lead to an increase or 
prolongation of anger state and potentiate aggression. For example, Tice and 
Baumeister (1993) hypothesised that by ruminating one may appreciate further 
implications of an offence (e.g. loss of social standing), recall similar past grievances, 
or see the incident as part of a broader context of injustice, which increases or maintains 
anger. Similarly, Sukhodolsky et al. (2001) proposed that angry rumination triggers new
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episodes of anger, amplifies the intensity and duration of anger, and potentiates 
behavioural responses towards resolution and retaliation.
The few studies that have examined angry rumination have provided support for its role 
in enhancing anger-state experience and increasing the likelihood of aggressive 
responses. Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) examined the impact of rumination and 
distraction on angry mood. They found that rumination increased anger, and distraction 
either decreased it or had no impact on it. They also found more negative beliefs, 
memories and events present in the stories that participants induced to ruminate wrote 
in response to an ambiguous sentence. Linden et al. (2003) found that angry rumination 
was associated with anger-in and trait anger on the State-Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory (STAXI; Spielberger, 1988). They interpreted this as indicating that 
individuals high on trait anger manifest their angry outlook through a set of repetitive 
thoughts (i.e. rumination), which, in turn, predisposes them to further anger experiences 
and makes it more difficult to recover from such experiences. They also found that the 
presence of a ruminative style worsened the consequences of avoidance of anger on 
men’s blood pressure and reversed the otherwise beneficial effect of assertion for 
women. Bushman, Pedersen, Vasquez, Bonacci and Miller (2001; cited in Bushman, 
2002) found that compared to participants who focused their attention away from their 
angry mood (i.e. distracted), participants who ruminated on their angry mood later 
engaged in more displaced aggression towards an incompetent confederate. Bushman 
(2002) also found that asking angered participants to ruminate about the individual who 
had provoked them led to more anger and aggression than those who distracted from
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their angry mood or did nothing. Finally, within the field of sports psychology, Maxwell 
(2004) found that rumination on provocations and the associated anger led to a greater 
risk of retaliation.
2.3.1. Anger/Aggression and Interpersonal Problem Solving
There has been no research conducted into whether, like depressive rumination, angry 
rumination also leads to deficits in interpersonal problem solving. However, there is a 
substantial amount of evidence linking anger and aggression to poor interpersonal 
problem solving. In fact, aggression and violent behaviour has often been described as a 
maladaptive attempt at trying to solve a social problem (e.g. Basquill, Nezu, Nezu & 
Klein, 2004; D’Zurilla, Chang & Sanna, 2003; Jarvinen, 2001). In support of this view, 
a number of studies have found a significant positive relationship between social 
problem solving deficits and aggression in both children and adolescents (e.g. Lochman 
& Dodge, 1994; Lochman & Lampron, 1986; Lochman, Wayland & White, 1993; 
Loeber & Dishion, 1985). In particular, aggressive children and adolescents have been 
found to generate fewer alternative solutions to interpersonal problems compared to 
their more pro-social peers, and the quality of the solutions they generate are poor, in 
that they are more aggressive and less effective (e.g. Asamow & Callan, 1985; 
Lochman & Lampron, 1986; Lochman, Lampron, Burch & Curry, 1985; Richard & 
Dodge, 1982).
Several studies have also demonstrated such a link in adults (e.g. Basquill et al., 2004; 
D’Zurilla et al., 2003; McMurran, Blair & Egan, 2002; Tescher, Conger, Edmondson &
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Conger, 1999). For example, D’Zurilla et al. (2003) found that, amongst college 
students, poor social problem solving (as measured by the Social Problem-Solving 
Inventory-Revised -  SPSI-R; D’Zurilla, Nezu & Maydeu-Olivares, 2001) was a 
significant predictor of subsequent aggression. Also, all three dysfunctional problem 
solving dimensions on the SPSI-R (i.e. Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), 
Impulsivity/Carelessness Style (ICS) and Avoidance Style (AS)) were positively 
correlated with both anger and hostility. In addition, Tescher et al. (1999) found that 
high-anger prone participants had poorer social skills (i.e. total SPSI score (Social 
Problem Solving Inventory; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1990)) than low anger prone 
individuals. This was especially true for the Problem Orientation Scale, which measures 
the motivational component of social problem solving. Finally, several studies on 
maritally violent men have consistently found they possess deficits in interpersonal 
problem solving, in that they produce fewer competent solutions to hypothetical conflict 
situations and their solutions involve more aggression compared with non-violent 
controls (Dutton & Browning, 1988; Holtzworth-Munroe & Anglin, 1991).
2.3.2. Anger and Cognitive Inflexibility
Whilst there has been no research conducted into a possible direct link between anger 
(or angry rumination) and cognitive inflexibility, there is some evidence to suggest that 
cognitive inflexibility may be a feature of some individuals with anger-control 
problems. Neurological models have suggested that violence may be associated with 
dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex (Cummings, 1985; Heaton, 1981). Evidence for this 
has come from neuroimaging studies, which have demonstrated that prefrontal activity
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is reduced in many violent offenders (see Soderstrom, Tullberg, Wikkelso, Ekholm & 
Forsman, 2000 for a review). This appears to be particularly true for those offenders 
who commit impulsive or affective violent acts compared to those who commit planned 
or predatory ones (Raine et al., 1998). Raine et al. (1998) hypothesised that the reduced 
prefrontal activity in these offenders makes it more difficult for them to regulate 
aggressive impulses originating from sub-cortical structures.
Evidence for these models also comes from studies using measures that are sensitive to 
prefrontal deficits, such as the WCST. Patients with lesions of the prefrontal cortex 
have frequently been found to exhibit perseverative behaviour and reduced cognitive 
flexibility on tasks such as the WCST (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Bergvall, 
Wessely, Forsman and Hansen (2001) found that violent offenders showed marked 
impairment on an attentional set-shifting task that was analogous to the WCST. Also, 
Sreenivasan et al. (1997) found that cognitive inflexibility, as measured by number of 
perseverative responses on the WCST, was a significant factor in distinguishing 
between high and low violent psychiatric patients. Unlike previous studies (e.g. Nestor, 
Haycock, Doiron, Kelly & Kelly, 1995), the WCST scores were independent of the 
presence of a psychotic disorder, in that both high violent psychotic and non-psychotic 
participants performed similarly. This suggests that cognitively inflexibility may be 
more closely linked to violence than psychiatric diagnosis and provides support for the 
neurological models of violence. Sreenivasan et al. (1997) concluded that cognitive 
inflexibility may increase the likelihood of violence by making it difficult for people to 
consider alternative explanations for other’s behaviour (especially non-hostile
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explanations), and to develop different approaches to dealing with difficult situations or 
conflicts. Similarly, many theorists have hypothesised that cognitive inflexibility (or 
prefrontal dysfunction) enables the development of violence by impairing the 
acquisition of social and moral knowledge (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & 
Damasio, 1999; Damasio 2000; Grattan & Eslinger, 1992; Lapierre, Braun & Hodgins, 
1995; Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse & Colletti, 2000). Therefore, they have proposed a 
direct link between cognitive inflexibility, social problem solving deficits and 
aggression.
In support of this, there has been some evidence to suggest a link between cognitive 
flexibility and interpersonal problem solving. For example, Rubin and Martin (1994) 
found that cognitive flexibility was positively associated with interpersonal 
communication competence. Also, cognitive flexibility has been found to be 
significantly associated with social problem solving in patients with schizophrenia 
(Addington & Addington, 1999; Hatashita-Wong, Smith, Silverstein, Hull & Willson, 
2002). For example, Hatashita-Wong et al. (2002) found that cognitive flexibility (i.e. 
WCST conceptual level responses) was correlated with several of the social problem 
solving measures from the Social Problem-Solving Assessment Battery (SPSA; Sayers, 
Bellack, Wade, Bennett & Fong, 1995), such as correctness, appropriateness, and 
elaboration of solutions to hypothetical social problem scenarios. Also, the WCST 
categories completed measure was found to be significantly correlated with elaboration 
of scenarios and appreciation of the potential limitations of solutions.
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2.4. Current Study
Given that depressive rumination has been found to impair interpersonal problem 
solving, it seems important to establish whether this is also true for angry rumination. 
As angry rumination has been found to increase anger and potentiate aggression (e.g. 
Bushman, 2002; Bushman et al., 2001; Maxwell, 2004; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1998), and both anger and aggression have been linked with interpersonal problem 
solving deficits (e.g. D’Zurilla et al., 2003; Lochman & Dodge, 1994; Tescher et al.,
1999), it seems reasonable to hypothesise that angry rumination may have a detrimental 
impact upon interpersonal problem solving. In particular, angry rumination may impair 
an individual’s ability to generate multiple strategies to solve a social problem, and 
instead lead to a narrowing of options that the individual considers. Also, as rumination 
has been found to increase angry mood and negative, biased thinking (Rusting & Nolen- 
Hoeskema, 1998), the types of solutions that people are able to produce may be 
ineffective. In particular, they may be of a hostile, aggressive nature.
Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) suggested that rumination is associated with a 
cognitive style that is inflexible and perseverative in nature, and that this cognitive 
inflexibility may contribute to impairments in social problem solving. However, they 
did not examine this hypothesis directly, and it therefore seems important to investigate 
whether there is a link between cognitive inflexibility and interpersonal problem­
solving deficits. There is a small amount of research, especially in the schizophrenia 
literature, that suggests such a relationship (e.g. Addington & Addington, 1999; 
Hatashita-Wong et al., 2002; Rubin & Martin, 1994). Also, whilst there is some
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evidence of a link between angry rumination and aggressive behaviour, and a link 
between violence and cognitive inflexibility, it is not clear whether angry ruminators are 
also cognitively inflexible, as has been found to be the case with depressive ruminators 
(Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).
The aim of this study was therefore to investigate whether angry rumination has a 
detrimental impact on people’s ability to solve interpersonal problems. In addition, it 
aimed to explore whether people who tend to engage in angry rumination have an 
inflexible cognitive style and whether this impacts upon their interpersonal problem 
solving ability. Also, as Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) hypothesised that 
rumination was the result of an inflexible cognitive style and was likely to contribute to 
difficulties in interpersonal problem solving, and because of the hypothesised links in 
this study between cognitive flexibility and angry rumination and between angry 
rumination and interpersonal problem solving deficits, the study also aimed to explore 
whether angry rumination mediates the relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
interpersonal problem solving.
In effect, these aims were investigated in two studies. However, in practice, both studies 
were conducted on the same participants and combined within a single testing session. 
In study 1, the focus was upon trait angry rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) 
considered the tendency to engage in a ruminative response style to be an individual 
difference variable that was relatively constant over time. For example, Nolen- 
Hoeksema, Morrow and Frederickson (1991) found that 83% of participants were
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consistent in their response to a depressed mood. Therefore, the term ‘trait angry 
rumination’ was employed in this study to describe an individual’s tendency to engage 
in a ruminative response style in the presence of an angry mood. Study 1 utilised a 
correlational design and aimed to explore the relationships between trait angry 
rumination (as measured by the Anger Rumination Scale - ARS; Sukhodolsky et al., 
2001), cognitive flexibility (as measured by performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort 
Test-64 - WCST-64; Kongs, Thompson, Iverson & Heaton, 2000), and interpersonal 
problem solving (as measured by the MEPS and the SPSI-R).
Study 2 employed an experimental design and explored the impact of state angry 
rumination on interpersonal problem solving. This involved inducing participants to feel 
angry, after which they were either induced to ruminate or distract from their angry 
mood. The impact of these experimental manipulations on interpersonal problem 
solving was then measured using the MEPS.
2.5. Hypotheses
2.5.1. Study 1: Trait Angry Rumination
1) Trait angry rumination (on the ARS) will be associated with performance on the 
WCST-64, in that those participants who score higher on the ARS will be more 
cognitively inflexible than participants who have a lower score on the ARS. In 
particular, individuals with higher levels of trait angry rumination will commit 
more perseverative and failure to maintain set errors on the WCST-64 than
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individuals with lower levels of trait angry rumination. In addition, this relationship 
will be independent of cognitive functions that may be associated with performance 
on the WCST-64 (i.e. general intelligence and working memory). However, it is 
likely to covary with trait anger, as measured by the trait anger scale of the State- 
Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999).
2) Performance on the test of cognitive flexibility (i.e. the WCST-64) will also 
correlate with performance on the interpersonal problem solving measures (i.e. the 
MEPS and the SPSI-R), in that those people who are more cognitively inflexible 
will demonstrate poorer interpersonal problem solving skills. This relationship will 
also be independent of general intelligence and working memory.
3) Trait angry rumination (as measured by the ARS) will be associated with measures 
of social problem solving (i.e. MEPS and SPSI-R), in that those participants high 
on trait angry rumination will exhibit less effective interpersonal problem solving 
than those low on trait angry rumination. This relationship will be independent of 
general intelligence, working memory and trait anger.
4) Trait angry rumination (as measured by the ARS) will mediate the relationship 
between cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem solving. This hypothesis 
will be tested by a series of regressions, as outlined in Baron and Kenny (1986). 
First, the mediator (i.e. trait angry rumination) will be regressed onto the 
independent variable (i.e. cognitive flexibility). Then the dependent variable (i.e.
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interpersonal problem solving) will be regressed onto the independent variable (i.e. 
cognitive flexibility). Finally, the dependent variable (i.e. interpersonal problem 
solving) will be regressed onto both the independent variable (i.e. cognitive 
flexibility) and the mediator (i.e. trait angry rumination). In order to establish 
mediation the following conditions must be met: (1) the independent variable must 
affect the mediator in the first equation, (2) the independent variable must affect the 
dependent variable in the second equation, (3) the mediator must affect the 
dependent variable in the third equation, and (4) the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable must be less in the third equation than in the 
second equation. The Sobel (1982) test will be used to determine whether the 
mediator (i.e. trait angry rumination) significantly accounts for the relationship 
between the independent variable (i.e. cognitive flexibility) and the dependent 
variable (i.e. interpersonal problem solving). Also, these relationships will be 
independent of the controlling variables mentioned earlier (i.e. working memory, 
general intelligence and trait anger).
2.5.2. Study2: State Angry Rumination
1) Participants who have ruminated following the anger induction procedure will be 
angrier than those who have distracted.
2) Participants who have been induced to ruminate following the anger induction 
procedure will produce less effective solutions to interpersonal problem-solving 
scenarios on the MEPS compared to a group that has been distracted from their
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angry mood, and compared to participants’ performance on the MEPS before the 
anger induction.
3) The influence of the response manipulations (i.e. rumination and distraction) on 
interpersonal problem solving effectiveness will vary depending on whether the 
participants are high or low on cognitive flexibility. Participants low on cognitive 
flexibility will show particular deficits in interpersonal problem solving following 
the rumination induction. However, participants high on cognitive flexibility may 
be less influenced by the rumination induction and, therefore, will not exhibit a 
decrease in interpersonal problem solving effectiveness after the rumination 
induction. In contrast, the level of cognitive flexibility should have little effect on 
the participants who have been induced to distract, with participants both high and 
low on cognitive flexibility showing little change in their interpersonal problem 
solving effectiveness from pre to post distraction induction.
3. Method
3.1. Participants
One-hundred and three participants (48 males and 55 females) were recruited from 
UCL’s student population. Posters advertising the study were placed throughout UCL 
and this was the principal method of recruiting participants. Participants were paid £6 
for taking part in the study. In terms of inclusion and exclusion criteria, all participants
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were accepted onto the study with the exception of those students who were not able to 
speak English fluently. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 58 years of age (M = 
23.73, SD = 5.76) and the vast majority of participants were undertaking or had 
completed an undergraduate degree (i.e. 98.1%).
The estimated number of participants needed in this study, which was based on a power 
calculation, was 85. The effect size for the power analysis was based upon the Davis 
and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) study, which examined the relationship between 
depressive rumination and cognitive flexibility. This study provided an estimate of the 
effect hypothesised for study 1, which, given its focus on individual differences, was 
predicted to be smaller than that for study 2. Therefore, this association was chosen 
because it should represent the smallest effect in the study. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2000) found associations which ranged in effect size from medium to large. As a 
conservative estimate, the smallest of these was selected for the purposes of statistical 
power estimation. In order to have 80% power to detect a change in R-squared of .09 in 
a multiple regression (representing a partial correlation of .30, the lower bound of the 
medium effect range) a sample size of 85 was required (two-tailed).
3.2. Ethics
The UCL Committee on the Ethics of Non-NHS Human Research approved this study. 
A copy of the approval letter is provided in the appendix. There were several ethical 
dilemmas raised in this study. Firstly, the study involved some deception, in that certain
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information was withheld from participants until after their data had been collected. In 
particular, participants were not told that the focus of the research was on angry 
rumination. Also, participants were not informed about the purpose of the anger 
induction and response manipulation tasks. Instead, these tasks were described as 
imagination exercises. The rationale for temporarily withholding this information from 
participants was to avoid any bias in their responses to the anger induction and response 
manipulation tasks. For example, if participants had been told that the purpose of the 
anger induction task was to make them angry, this may have affected how they 
responded to the task. The other ethical dilemma raised in this study was the induction 
of anger in participants, which may be aversive or stressful. This dilemma has posed 
problems for other researchers into anger (e.g. Baumeister, Stillwell & Wotman, 1990), 
as it is difficult to strike a balance between inducing anger experience that is authentic 
and measurable and ensuring that the study is ethically sound.
A number of steps were taken to mitigate against the impact of these ethical dilemmas. 
Firstly, in order to minimise the potential stress of being made angry, a relatively mild 
anger induction procedure was chosen, which has been shown to induce a mild anger 
reaction in participants (e.g. Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Secondly, participants 
were monitored throughout the data collection process for any adverse reactions to the 
anger induction procedure. No such adverse reactions occurred. Finally, a full 
debriefing was provided once the participants had completed the study. In particular, 
any negative reactions to the anger induction or response manipulation tasks were 
attended to and discussed with the participant to ensure that they did not persist.
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3.3. Measures
The Trait Anger Scale o f the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; 
Spielberger, 1999). This scale measures how often an individual experiences anger over 
time. The scale consists of 10 items and responses are measured on 4 point Likert-type 
scales. This scale has been shown to be internally consistent (alpha = .82; Speilberger,
1999), to correlate positively with other measures of anger (Speilberger, 1999), and to 
discriminate high anger individuals from others (Deffenbacher, Deen & Brandon, 1986; 
Lopez & Thurman, 1986).
Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky et al, 2001). This 19-item questionnaire 
was developed to measure the tendency to focus attention on angry moods, recall past 
anger experiences, and think about the causes and consequences of anger episodes. It 
has been found to have adequate internal consistency (alpha = .93) and one month test- 
retest reliability (.77). Also, convergent and discriminant validity were supported by the 
expected pattern of associations between the ARS and measures of anger experience, 
anger expression, negative affectivity, emotional attention, satisfaction with life, and 
social desirability (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). A copy of this measure is provided in the 
appendix.
Mood Questionnaire. State anger was measured using a mood questionnaire that was 
based on the one employed in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study. The 
questionnaire asked participants to rate their present mood on a number of 9 point
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Likert scales, ranging from “not at all” (1) to “extremely” (9). Anger was assessed by 
using several items (i.e. “angry”, “hostile”, “irritable”, “annoyed” and “disgusted”), 
which were averaged to attain a single measure of anger. The questionnaire also 
included a number of filler items measuring other mood states, such as anxiety and 
sadness. The questionnaire was found to have good internal consistency in this study, in 
that the alpha coefficients ranged from .77 to .85. A copy of this questionnaire is 
included in the appendix.
Wisconsin Card Sort Test - 64 Card Version (WCST-64; Kongs et al, 2000). The 
WCST-64 was utilised as the measure of cognitive flexibility. It is an abbreviated form 
of the standard 128 card version of the WCST (Heaton, 1981), in that it only uses the 
first 64 cards. It has good test-retest reliability (i.e. the median generalisability 
coefficient was .60; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993), and construct 
validity (e.g. Shute & Huertas, 1990). The WCST-64 consists of four stimulus cards and 
64 response cards that vary in terms of their shape (crosses, circles, triangles, or stars), 
colour (red, blue, yellow, or green) and number (one to four). The four stimulus cards 
are placed in front of the participant, who is then asked to match each of the 64 cards in 
the deck to whichever stimulus card he or she thinks it matches. The participant is not 
told how to match the cards, only whether each response is correct or incorrect. After 
ten consecutive correct responses the matching principle is changed without informing 
the participant. This continues until the participant has matched all 64 cards.
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Other Cognitive Tests: Wechsler Test o f Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) and 
the Backward Digit Span (from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- Revised - WAIS- 
R; Wechsler, 1981). As in the Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) study, measures of 
working memory (i.e. Backward Digit Span) and general intellectual functioning (i.e. 
WTAR) were included in this study because they were thought to be potentially 
correlated with performance on the WCST-64. As such, it was felt to be important to 
measure these cognitive processes and control for their possible effects to ensure that 
any differences between the groups were due to differences in cognitive flexibility and 
not to working memory or general intellectual functioning. In the Backward Digit Span 
task, the researcher reads aloud groups of digits to the participant who then repeats them 
back in the reverse order in which they were given. The WTAR involves the participant 
pronouncing a list of words aloud.
Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedure (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). The MEPS 
was designed as a measure of interpersonal problem solving, and it involves asking 
participants to generate solutions to hypothetical interpersonal problems. It has 
satisfactory internal consistency (from .80 to .84) and construct validity (e.g. Platt & 
Spivack, 1972, 1975). This study employed a shortened version of the MEPS (i.e. 
scenarios 2, 4, 8, and 10), which is similar to the procedure adopted by Lyubomirsky 
and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) and Watkins and Baracaia (2002). The four scenarios 
utilised in this study were as follows: (a) you are having problems getting along with 
your boss, (b) you have just moved to a new area and you don’t know anyone, (c) you 
notice that one of your friends seems to be avoiding you, and (d) you had an argument
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with your boyfriend/girlfriend. Participants were presented with the beginning and 
ending of each scenario. An example of one of the scenarios given to participants was: 
“You notice that one of your friends seems to be avoiding you. You really like and 
enjoy spending time with this person, and want him or her to like you. The situation 
ends when he or she likes you again. Begin the story when you notice your friend 
avoiding you”. Participants were asked to record their solutions in writing.
The scoring procedure employed in this study was identical to that of Watkins and 
Baracaia (2002), in that a judge who was blind to the condition scored all solutions for 
the number of relevant means and for their effectiveness. Relevant means were defined 
as sequential behaviours that were effective in enabling the participant to obtain the 
stated goal. The effectiveness of each response was scored on a 7 point Likert scale, 
ranging from “not at all effective” (1) to “extremely effective” (7). Finally, as in 
Watkins and Baracaia (2002), a second independent judge, also unaware of the 
condition, scored a random selection of 10% of all responses. High inter-rater reliability 
was found between the two judges (relevant means, r = .90; effectiveness, r = .89).
Social Problem-Solving Inventory-Revised (SPSI-R; D ’Zurilla et al., 2001). The short 
version of the SPSI-R contains 25 items and is a self-report measure that assesses 
participants’ strengths and weaknesses in their problem solving abilities. It has five 
scales: Positive Problem Orientation (PPO), Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), 
Rational Problem Solving (RPS), Impulsivity/Carelessness Style (ICS), and Avoidance 
Style (AS). The SPSI-R has been shown to have good internal consistency (.76 to .92),
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test-retest reliability (.72 to .88), and construct validity (Chang & D’Zurilla, 1996; 
D’Zurilla et al., 2001).
3.4. Procedure
As mentioned previously, all participants completed study 1 and 2 within the same 
testing session. The procedures for each study are described below and the chronology 
is presented diagrammatically (see Figure 1 below).
3.4.1. Study 1
Participants were first asked to rate their current mood (baseline) on the mood 
questionnaire. They were then given the three brief cognitive tasks to complete: the 
WTAR, the Backward Digit Span, and the WCST-64. Following this, they were asked 
to solve two of the interpersonal problem solving scenarios from the MEPS. 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves experiencing these situations and were 
given the following instructions: “In this task we are interested in your imagination. 
You are to make up some stories. For each story you will be given the beginning o f the 
story and how the story ends. Your job is to make up a story that connects the beginning 
that is given to you with the ending given to you. In other words, you will make up the 
middle o f the story. Write at least one paragraph for each story. ” After this, 
participants completed the SPSI-R.
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As part of study 1, participants were also asked to fill out two trait measures (i.e. the 
trait anger scale of the STAXI-2 and the ARS). However, these two measures were 
administered at the very end of the procedure, in order to disguise the study’s focus on 
angry rumination (please refer to the * on Figure 1 below).
3.4.2. Study 2
All participants then underwent an anger induction procedure. The procedure employed 
in this study was based on the idiographic anger induction used in the Rusting and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study. To disguise the purpose of the task, participants were 
told it was an imagination exercise that was concerned with their “ability to remember 
and imagine past experiences”. Participants were invited to reach into an envelope and 
choose a slip of paper. They were told that on each slip of paper was a topic about 
which they were to choose a past memory to remember and imagine. What the 
participants did not know was that every slip of paper had the same topic written on it: 
“Think of a time in your life when somebody made you feel so angry you wanted to 
explode”. Once they had read the topic, participants were given the following 
instructions:
“During the next 5 minutes try to re-experience the memory you’ve retrieved as vividly 
as you can. Picture the event happening to you all over again. Picture in your “mind’s 
eye” the surroundings as clearly as possible. See the people or objects; hear the 
sounds; experience the events happening to you. Think the thoughts you actually 
thought in that situation. Feel the same feelings you felt in that situation. Let yourself
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react as i f  you were actually there right now. As you ’re re-imagining the event, write 
about what is happening, what you are thinking and how you are feeling. ”
Following the anger induction procedure, another measure of mood was taken (using 
the mood questionnaire). Then one-half of participants were randomly assigned to a 
rumination induction procedure, and one-half were randomly assigned to a distraction 
induction procedure.
Rumination and Distraction Induction Procedures:
These procedures were adapted from those used in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1998) study. Participants in the rumination condition were asked to focus their 
attention on thoughts that were self-focused and relevant to the emotion induced (i.e. 
anger), but the items did not directly refer to anger. They included items such as “why 
the person treated you as they did” and “why what happened to you was unfair”. As in 
the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study, items used in previous rumination 
research (i.e. Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) 
were modified to make them more relevant to anger. In order to do this, themes from 
the ARS and other relevant literature (e.g. attribution theory of anger (Averill, 1982, 
1983; Frijda, 1986)), as well as the few examples provided by Rusting and Nolen- 
Hoeksema (1998), were used to generate items. In the distraction condition, participants 
were asked to focus their attention on external, non-emotional details, such as “the 
layout of the local post office”. These items were derived directly from the items used
105
in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study. A total of 17 items were generated 
for each condition (please refer to the appendix).
This task was also introduced as an imagination exercise. Participants were asked to 
close their eyes and recall the memory they had just retrieved in the previous 
imagination exercise. The researcher read aloud the instructions from the anger 
induction procedure to facilitate participants’ recall of the memory. Then they were 
given the following instructions:
“Now I  am going to read out a series o f ideas that I  would like you to think about. 
Please continue to keep your eyes closed throughout this exercise. I  will read out each 
item at a set pace. As I  read each idea out loud, I  would like you to remember the 
memory you retrieved and use your imagination and concentration to focus your mind 
on each o f the items. ”
Each item was read out loud by the researcher at a rate of 1 per 17 seconds, which 
meant that participants spent a total of five minutes either ruminating or distracting. 
Following the rumination/distraction procedure another measure of mood was taken. 
Both groups were then asked to solve the other two interpersonal scenarios from the 
MEPS. The administration of the two sets of interpersonal problem solving scenarios 
was counterbalanced across the two presentations. The entire procedure can be seen 
diagrammatically below in Figure 1.
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Figure 1:
Study 1:
■ Mood Questionnaire (Baseline)
■ Cognitive Tests (WTAR, Backward Digit Span, WCST-64)
■ Interpersonal Problem Solving Measures (MEPS 1&2 & SPSI-R) 
Study 2:
Anger Induction Procedure followed by Mood Questionnaire (2)
V2 receive Rumination Induction XA receive Distraction Induction
followed by Mood Questionnaire (3) followed by Mood Questionnaire (3)
I l
MEPS 3&4 followed by the final Mood Questionnaire (4)
Trait Measures (ARS and trait scale of STAXI-2)*
(*Although the ARS and STAXI-2 form part o f study 1, they were administered at the 
end o f study 2 to disguise the focus o f the research on angry rumination)
3.5. Design
Study 1: Study 1 utilised a correlational design, in which the associations between three 
variables were examined: trait angry rumination (as measured by the ARS), cognitive 
flexibility (as measured by the WCST-64), and interpersonal problem solving (as 
measured by the MEPS and SPSI-R).
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Study 2: Study 2 employed a randomised experimental design. More specifically, it was 
a 2x2 mixed model factorial design. The first variable, response condition, was 
between subjects and had two levels (rumination induction versus distraction 
induction), referring to the random assignment of participants to either a rumination 
induction or a distraction induction. The second variable, pre and post MEPS 
presentation, was within subjects, and also had two levels that referred to the 
presentation of the MEPS scenarios before and after anger and rumination/distraction 
induction procedures. The dependent variables were the various scores on the MEPS 
(i.e. number of relevant means and effectiveness of solutions). In order to more fully 
assess the relationship between the three constructs of interest (i.e. angry rumination, 
cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem solving), another between subjects factor 
was added making it a 2x2x2 mixed model factorial design. This additional variable 
was cognitive flexibility, which had two levels (i.e. high and low cognitive flexibility) 
that were derived through a median split of participants’ perseverative errors scores on 
the WCST-64.
4. Results
4.1. Skewness
All of the WCST-64 raw scores were found to be significantly skewed. Therefore, the 
WCST-64 standard scores, which were normally distributed, were utilised in most of 
the analyses. The only WCST-64 raw score employed in this study was perseverative
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errors (see study 2), which was significantly positively skewed (skewness = 1.795). 
After applying an inverse transformation to the perseverative errors raw score data, the 
distribution was no longer significantly positively skewed (skewness = -.166). In 
addition to the WCST-64 variables, the majority of the negative affect data (i.e. anger, 
anxiety and sadness) were also significantly positively skewed. This is consistent with 
what has been found in other studies (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1984; Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). In order to rectify the positive skewness, the 
appropriate transformations were applied to these data, and the analyses that utilised the 
data were repeated to ensure there were no differences between the transformed and 
non-transformed data (see study 2). All other measures employed in this study were 
normally distributed.
4.2. Study 1
Study 1 employed a correlational design and examined the relationships between trait 
angry rumination, cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem solving. The results of 
the analyses for study 1 are presented below and are organised by the hypotheses they 
relate to.
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4.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Participants who have a greater tendency towards trait angry 
rumination (as measured by the ARS) will be more cognitively inflexible (on the 
WCST-64).
In order to test this hypothesis and also hypothesis 4 (i.e. that trait angry rumination 
mediates the relationship between cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem 
solving), trait angry rumination was regressed onto cognitive flexibility. This represents 
the first test of mediation, as outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), in which the 
hypothesised mediator (i.e. trait angry rumination) is regressed onto the proposed 
independent variable (i.e. cognitive flexibility). This regression was found to be not 
significant (F(l,100) = .154, p = .696), which does not support hypothesis 1. Further, it 
means that the first test of mediation failed, thus suggesting that trait angry rumination 
(on the ARS) does not mediate the relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
interpersonal problem solving.
4.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Participants who are more cognitively inflexible (on the WCST- 
64) will demonstrate less effective interpersonal problem solving skills (on the MEPS 
and SPSI-R).
This hypothesis was tested by regressing interpersonal problem solving onto cognitive 
flexibility. In order to reduce the risk of making a type 1 error, a composite measure of 
cognitive flexibility was derived. The composite measure included the following scores 
from the WCST-64: total number of errors, non-perseverative errors, perseverative 
errors and conceptual level responses, which were all found to be highly correlated with 
one another. This composite measure of cognitive flexibility was found to significantly
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predict both the number of relevant means (F(l,95) = 6.322, p = .014; adjusted R square 
= .053) and effectiveness ratings (F(l,95) = 5.552, p = .021; adjusted R square = . 045) 
on the MEPS. In order to examine this relationship further, a series of regressions were 
conducted, in which the two measures from the MEPS (i.e. number of relevant means 
and effectiveness ratings) were regressed onto each of the four WCST-64 scores that 
comprised the composite measure of cognitive flexibility. Due to the large number of 
statistical comparisons being made, p < .01 was used to determine statistical 
significance instead of the customary p < .05. Using this more stringent criteria, only 
the non-perseverative errors score from the WCST-64 was able to significantly predict 
performance on the two measures of interpersonal problem solving from the MEPS: 
number of relevant means (F(l,95) = 8.491, p = .004; adjusted R square = .072) and 
effectiveness ratings (F(l,95) = 7.078, p = .009; adjusted R square = .060). With regards 
to the other scores from the WCST-64, total number of errors approached significance 
in predicting both the number of relevant means (F(l,95) = 6.300, p = .014; adjusted R 
square = .052) and effectiveness ratings (F(l,95) = 5.605, p = .020; adjusted R square = 
.046) on the MEPS. Also, conceptual level responses would have significantly predicted 
social problem solving on the MEPS if the less stringent p < .05 level of significance 
had been used (number of relevant means; F(l,95) = 4.913, p = .029; adjusted R square 
= .039 and effectiveness ratings; F(l,95) = 4.016, p = .048; adjusted R square = .030). 
However, the perseverative errors score was not significantly related to social problem 
solving on the MEPS (relevant means; F(l,95) = 3.059, p = .084 and effectiveness 
ratings; F(l,95) = 3.108, p = .081). These results indicate that better performance on the
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non-perseverative errors score from the WCST-64 predicted enhanced social problem 
solving on the MEPS.
It was also predicted that the relationship between cognitive flexibility and interpersonal 
problem solving would be independent of other general cognitive functions that may 
correlate with performance on the WCST-64. Therefore, the regressions above, in 
which the two measures from the MEPS were regressed onto the composite measure of 
cognitive flexibility, were repeated with the addition of Digits Backwards (working 
memory measure) and the WTAR (general intelligence measure) as controlling 
variables. Once the controlling variables had been added, the composite measure of 
cognitive flexibility still significantly independently contributed to the model for both 
the number of relevant means (p = .227, t(l) = 2.197, p = .031) and the effectiveness 
ratings (P = .252, t(l) = 2.457, p = .016), but the overall regression equations were no 
longer significant (relevant means; F(3,92) = 1.610, p = .193 and effectiveness ratings; 
F(3,92) = 2.061, p = .111). In addition, as only the non-perseverative errors score from 
the WCST-64 was found to significantly (at p < .01) predict performance on the MEPS, 
only the regressions for this measure were repeated. As with the composite measure, 
once the controlling variables had been added, the non-perseverative errors score was 
found to still significantly contribute to the model for both the number of relevant 
means (p = .275, t(l) = 2.663, p = .009) and effectiveness ratings (P = .290, t(l) = 
2.821, p = .006). The overall regression equation was found to be significant for 
effectiveness ratings (F(3,92) = 2.701, p = .050), but not for number of relevant means 
(F(3,92) = 2.364, p = .076). Therefore, as predicted, the relationship between cognitive
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flexibility and interpersonal problem solving was found to be independent of both 
working memory and general intelligence.
4.2.3. Hypothesis 3: Participants who have a greater tendency towards trait angry 
rumination (on the ARS) will demonstrate poorer interpersonal problem solving (on 
the MEPS and SPSI-R).
This hypothesis was tested by regressing interpersonal problem solving onto trait angry 
rumination. Trait angry rumination was found to significantly predict how participants 
responded on the Negative Problem Orientation (NPO) scale of the SPSI-R (F(l,101) = 
24.294, p < .001; adjusted R square = .186), with those participants scoring highly on 
the ARS also scoring highly on the NPO. However, trait angry rumination did not 
significantly predict performance on either of the MEPS measures (number of relevant 
means; F(l,96) = .109, p = .742 and effectiveness ratings; F(l,96) = .021, p = .885). The 
relationship between ARS and NPO held even after adding the following controlling 
variables: working memory (Digits Backwards), general intelligence (WTAR) and trait 
anger (trait anger scale of the STAXI-2), in that the overall regression was still 
significant (F(4,97) = 6.797, p < .001; adjusted R square = .187) and ARS continued to 
significantly contribute to the model (p = .351, t(l) = 3.335, p = .001).
Taking the results of hypotheses 2 and 3 together, it appears as though cognitive 
flexibility predicts performance on the MEPS but not the SPSI-R, and trait angry 
rumination predicts performance on the SPSI-R but not the MEPS. In order to explore 
this finding further, three multiple regressions were conducted, in which each of the
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three measures of interpersonal problem solving (i.e. the NPO from the SPSI-R and the 
number of relevant means and effectiveness ratings from the MEPS) were regressed 
onto both the composite measure of cognitive flexibility and trait angry rumination (on 
the ARS). The results of these analyses confirmed the observations above. In particular, 
when regressing NPO from the SPSI-R onto both the composite measure of cognitive 
flexibility and trait angry rumination, only trait angry rumination significantly 
contributed to the relationship (p = .444, t(l) = 4.927, p < .001). The composite 
measure of cognitive flexibility was not a significant predictor in this model (P = -.030, 
t(l) = -.336, p = .738). However, when regressing the MEPS dependent variables (i.e. 
number of relevant means and effectiveness ratings) onto both cognitive flexibility and 
trait angry rumination, only the composite measure of cognitive flexibility significantly 
contributed to the relationship (number of relevant means; p = .251, t(l) = 2.511, p = 
.014 and effectiveness ratings; p = .235, t(l) = 2.348, p = .021). In contrast, trait angry 
rumination did not significantly contribute to either model (number of relevant means; P 
= -.039, t(l) = -.392, p = .696 and effectiveness ratings; p = -.020, t(l) = -.200, p = 
.842). Therefore, these results indicate that trait angry rumination predicts performance 
on the NPO scale of the SPSI-R, and cognitive flexibility (in particular, the non- 
perseverative errors score from the WCST-64) predicts performance on the MEPS, but 
not vice versa.
In summary, the results of the regression analyses found that, contrary to predictions, 
cognitive flexibility was not related to trait angry rumination. As this was the first test 
of mediation, this null result also suggests that trait angry rumination does not mediate
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the relationship between cognitive flexibility and social problem solving. However, 
both cognitive flexibility and trait angry rumination were found to independently 
predict social problem solving. More specifically, cognitive flexibility predicted how 
participants performed on the MEPS, and trait angry rumination predicted participants’ 
scores on the NPO scale of the SPSI-R. Also, as predicted, these relationships were 
found to be independent of working memory, general intelligence and trait anger. The 
results of these analyses are summarised below in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The results o f the regression analyses in which trait angry rumination is 
hypothesised to serve as a potential mediator o f the link between cognitive flexibility 
and social problem solving. All numbers represent standardised beta coefficients. *p < 
.01
4.3. Study 2
Study 2 utilised an experimental design, in which anger and rumination/distraction were 
induced in order to determine the impact of the response manipulations on interpersonal
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problem solving. As above, the results of the analyses are organised by hypothesis. 
However, before testing the hypotheses for study 2, a number of background checks on 
the data needed to be performed first, which are presented below.
4.3.1. Randomisation Check
The way the study was designed meant that it was not possible to match the two groups 
(i.e. rumination and distraction groups) on important variables, such as trait angry 
rumination, trait anger, or levels of cognitive flexibility. Therefore, a number of t-tests 
were conducted to check that the randomisation procedure was successful and that the 
two groups did not significantly differ on any of these important variables. The t-tests 
revealed that the two groups did not significantly differ on trait angry rumination 
(t(101) = -.106, p = .809), trait anger (t(101) = .312, p = .993), or cognitive flexibility 
(t(100) = .067, p = .602). Therefore, the randomisation procedure appeared to be 
successful in producing equivalent groups.
4.3.2. Mood Induction Checks
In order to ascertain whether the anger induction procedure was successful in inducing 
anger, a 2x2 mixed model factorial ANOVA was conducted on anger scores with one 
within subjects factor (pre and post induction) and one between subjects factor 
(response condition; rumination versus distraction). As predicted, the main effect of pre 
and post anger induction was significant (F(l,100) = 83.861, p < .001). A review of the 
means demonstrates that participants became angrier following the anger induction 
(Pre-induction; M = 1.706, SD = .088 and Post-induction; M = 3.135, SD = .176). There
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were no significant differences in anger levels between the two groups (i.e. the main 
effect of response condition was not significant; F(l,100) = 3.431, p = .067), nor was 
the interaction significant (F(l,100) = .513, p = .476). Therefore, the anger induction 
was successful in significantly increasing all participants’ levels of anger state.
In order to determine whether the anger induction produced a specific state of anger, 
two further 2x2 mixed model factorial ANOVAs were conducted, in which anxiety and 
sadness ratings were used as the within-subjects factor and response condition was 
included as the between subjects factor. With regards to the analysis conducted on the 
anxiety mood data, neither of the main effects, nor the interaction was significant (pre 
and post induction; F(l,100) = .520, p = .473, response condition; F(l,100) = 3.084, p = 
.082, and interaction; F(l,100) = .892, p = .347). Therefore, the anger induction did not 
significantly increase participants’ levels of anxiety. However, similar results to the 
anger data were found for the sadness ratings, in that the main effect of pre and post 
induction was significant (F(l,97) = 44.316, p < .001), but the other main effect and the 
interaction were not significant (F(l,97) = 2.033, p = .157 and F(l,97) = .181, p = .671, 
respectively). Therefore, following the anger induction, in addition to becoming angrier, 
participants also became sadder. Finally, as the negative mood data were significantly 
positively skewed, transformations were applied to ensure their distributions were 
normal. The above analyses were then repeated on the transformed data. The pattern of 
results was identical to those reported above.
117
4.3.3. Hypothesis 1: Participants who ruminate after the anger induction will be 
angrier than those who distract.
This hypothesis was examined by performing a 2x2 mixed model factorial ANOVA on 
anger scores with one between subjects factor (response condition; rumination versus 
distraction) and one within subjects factor (anger scores before and after the response 
manipulation). A significant interaction would support the hypothesis that the response 
manipulations differentially affected anger levels. The main effect for pre and post 
response manipulation was significant (F(l,100) = 46.004, p < .001), as was the main 
effect of response condition (F(1,00) = 13.946, p < .001). A consideration of the means 
demonstrates that participants were less angry after the response manipulations than 
before (Pre-induction anger; M = 3.133, SD = .175 and Post-induction anger; M = 
2.296, SD = .129), and participants in the rumination group were angrier than those in 
the distraction group (Rumination; M = 3.241, SD = .199 and Distraction; M = 2.188, 
SD = .199). More importantly, the interaction was also significant (F(l,100) = 17.188, p 
< .001), thus providing support for hypothesis 1. A perusal of the means in the bar chart 
below (see graph 1) indicates that participants in the rumination group had similar 
levels of anger before and after the response manipulation, but participants in the 
distraction group exhibited a reduction in their anger scores. Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
confirmed these observations, in that the rumination scores before and after the 
response manipulation were not significantly different (p = .065), but the difference in 
the distraction scores was significant (p < .001). Also, as the anger scores for the 
rumination and distraction groups prior to the response manipulations appeared
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dissimilar, an independent samples t-test was conducted, which revealed they were not 
significantly different (t(101) = -1.503, p = .128 one-tailed).
Graph 1: The Effects o f  Response Manipulations on Participants ’  Anger Scores
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In order to ascertain whether the response manipulations affected the other negative 
moods (i.e. anxiety and sadness) in the same way as anger, two further 2x2 mixed 
model factorial ANOVAs were performed with anxiety and sadness ratings as the 
within subjects factor and response condition as the between subjects factor. The pattern 
of results for both anxiety and sadness was identical to that of anger, in that the main 
effects (anxiety pre and post induction; F(l,99) = 47.046, p < .001, anxiety response 
condition; F(l,99) = 6.821, p = .010, sadness pre and post induction; F(l,100) = 14.464, 
p < .001, and sadness response condition; F(l,100) = 9.502, p = .003) and the
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interactions (anxiety interaction; F(l,99) = 6.246, p = .014 and sadness interaction; 
F(l,100) = 11.627, p = .001) were significant. Therefore, the response manipulations 
affected all of the negative moods in the same way, which supports the idea that 
rumination and distraction function similarly across all negative moods. It also suggests 
that the response manipulations were successfully neutral with respect to anger. Finally, 
the mood data were subjected to transformations and the analyses were repeated with 
the transformed data. The pattern of results was identical for the transformed and non­
transformed data.
4.3,4, Hypothesis 2: Participants who have been induced to ruminate after the anger 
induction will produce less effective solutions to interpersonal problem solving 
scenarios on the MEPS compared to those who have been induced to distract, and 
compared to their own performance on the MEPS before the anger and response 
manipulation inductions.
This hypothesis was explored through two 2x2 mixed model factorial ANOVAs, in 
which one factor was between subjects (response condition; rumination versus 
distraction) and the other factor was within subjects (performance on the MEPS before 
and after the anger and response manipulations). The two dependent variables were the 
number of relevant means and the effectiveness ratings on the MEPS. With regards to 
the number of relevant means, neither of the main effects, nor the interaction was 
significant (pre and post induction; F(l,95) = .603, p = .439, response condition; F(l,95) 
= .179, p = .673, and interaction; F(l,95) = .056, p = .813). For the other dependent 
variable, effectiveness ratings, only the main effect of pre and post MEPS was
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significant (F(l,95) = 5.827, p= .018), with the other main effect and interaction not 
reaching significance (F(l,95) = .004, p = .949 and F(l,95) = .427, p = .515, 
respectively). From looking at the means, it appears that all participants’ effectiveness 
scores decreased from pre to post anger and response manipulation inductions, 
irrespective of group membership (M = 4.486, SD = .144 and M = 4.163, SD = .138, 
respectively). Therefore, these results do not support hypothesis 2, in that all 
participants produced less effective solutions to the MEPS after the anger and response 
manipulation inductions, not just those participants who had ruminated.
4.3.5. Hypothesis 3: The influence of the response manipulations on interpersonal 
problem solving will vary depending on whether participants are high or low on 
cognitive flexibility. Those participants low on cognitive flexibility will have 
particular difficulty solving interpersonal problems if  they have also been induced to 
ruminate. However, participants high on cognitive flexibility will be less influenced 
by the rumination induction and will therefore not show a decrement in their 
interpersonal problem solving ability. The level of cognitive flexibility will not affect 
those participants induced to distract
This hypothesis was tested with a 2x2x2 mixed model factorial ANOVA, in which one 
factor was within subjects (performance on the MEPS before and after the anger and 
response manipulations) and two factors were between subjects (response condition; 
rumination versus distraction and cognitive flexibility; high versus low). The cognitive 
flexibility factor was derived by splitting participants’ perseverative error raw scores 
from the WCST-64 along the median. The dependent variable was the effectiveness
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ratings scores from the MEPS. As before, the main effect of pre and post MEPS was 
significant (F(l,92) = 4.349, p = .040). More interestingly, the triple interaction (i.e. pre 
and post MEPS, response condition, and high and low cognitive flexibility) was 
marginally significant (F(l,92) = 3.784, p = .055).
From the graphs below (see graph 2), it is clear that, at high levels of cognitive 
flexibility (i.e. low number of perseverative errors), the rumination group’s 
effectiveness scores changed little from pre to post anger and response manipulation 
inductions, whilst the distraction group’s effectiveness scores appear to have decreased. 
In contrast, at low levels of cognitive flexibility, the rumination group’s effectiveness 
scores decreased from pre to post induction, whereas the distraction group’s scores 
appear to have remained the same. In order to explore these observations, Bonferroni 
post-hoc tests were conducted on the triple interaction. The only significant difference 
found was that, at low levels of cognitive flexibility, the rumination group’s 
effectiveness scores decreased significantly following the anger and rumination 
inductions (p = .013). This finding supports hypothesis 3, in that those participants with 
low levels of cognitive flexibility showed a significant decrease in their interpersonal 
problem effectiveness after being induced to ruminate. In comparison, for those 
participants with high levels of cognitive flexibility, the rumination induction had little 
effect on their ability to solve interpersonal scenarios effectively. Also, as predicted, the 
distraction group’s scores were not significantly different from pre to post induction at 
either level of cognitive flexibility.
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Graph 2: Participants’ Change in Social Problem Solving Effectiveness Scores from 
Pre to Post Anger and Response Manipulations as a Function o f Levels o f Cognitive 
Flexibility
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This analysis was repeated with the controlling variables added (i.e. working memory, 
general intelligence and trait anger), which resulted in a 2x2x2 ANCOVA. Whilst the 
main effect of pre and post MEPS was no longer significant (F(l,88) = .825, p = .366), 
the addition of the controlling variables had little impact on the triple interaction, in that 
it still approached significance (F(l,88) = 3.666, p = .059). Also, as the perseverative 
error raw score data were significantly positively skewed, the 2x2x2 ANOVA was 
repeated after an inverse transformation had been applied to the perseverative error data. 
This resulted in very similar findings to those reported above, in that the main effect of 
pre and post MEPS was significant (F(l,90) = 4.895, p = .029) and the triple interaction 
approached significance (F(l,90) = 3.675, p = .058).
Distraction
Rumination
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5. Discussion
5.1. Summary of Results 
5.1.7. Study 1
Contrary to the prediction made by hypothesis 1, cognitive flexibility was found not to 
be related to participants’ scores on the ARS. As this null result also meant that the first 
test of mediation failed, it suggests that trait angry rumination cannot mediate the 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem solving, thus 
refuting hypothesis 4. However, the other two hypotheses were supported by the results 
found for study 1. Both cognitive flexibility and trait angry rumination were found to 
predict interpersonal problem solving. In particular, enhanced performance on the non- 
perseverative errors score from the WCST-64 predicted better interpersonal problem 
solving (i.e. greater number of relevant means and higher effectiveness scores) on the 
MEPS. However, cognitive flexibility was not related to how participants responded on 
the SPSI-R. In contrast, how participants responded on the ARS predicted their scores 
on the NPO scale of the SPSI-R, with those participants scoring highly on the ARS also 
scoring highly on the NPO. However, participants’ scores on the ARS did not predict 
performance on the MEPS. Finally, as predicted, these relationships were found to be 
independent of working memory, general intelligence and trait anger.
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5.1.2. Study 2
As in study 1, the results found for study 2 provided mixed support for the hypotheses. 
Firstly, whilst the anger induction was found to be successful in significantly increasing 
participants’ levels of anger, it also significantly increased their levels of sadness, which 
was not predicted. Participants in the rumination condition were found to be angrier 
than those in the distraction condition, which provided support for hypothesis 1. 
However, contrary to predictions made by hypothesis 2, participants who were induced 
to ruminate did not demonstrate poorer interpersonal problem solving than participants 
who had been induced to distract. Instead, all participants evidenced less effective 
interpersonal problem solving after the inductions compared to before, irrespective of 
whether they had been induced to ruminate or distract. Finally, as was predicted by 
hypothesis 3, the effects of the response manipulations on interpersonal problem solving 
were found to depend upon participants’ level of cognitive flexibility. In particular, the 
rumination induction only resulted in less effective interpersonal problem solving for 
those participants who were less cognitively flexible.
5.2. Interpretation of Results
5.2.1. Study 1
The lack of a significant relationship found in this study between cognitive flexibility 
and trait angry rumination is surprising given the research on depressive rumination, in 
which depressive ruminators have been found to commit more perseverative and failure 
to maintain set errors than depressive non-ruminators (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema,
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2000). It is also surprising when considering the link that has been found between 
cognitive inflexibility and violence (e.g. Bergvall et al., 2001; Sreenivasan et al., 1997). 
If the result found in this study is reliable then it suggests that an inflexible cognitive 
style does not underlie trait angry rumination. However, there may be reasons to 
question the reliability of this null result. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) pre­
selected participants who were high and low on depressive rumination, whereas this 
study did not. The majority of participants (70%) in this study scored within one 
standard deviation of the mean on the ARS. Therefore, by not pre-selecting participants 
on the far ends of the continuum (e.g. those participants who scored two standard 
deviations or more away from the mean on the ARS), the amount of variability was 
potentially reduced, thereby lessening the likelihood of finding a relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and trait angry rumination. If this study had pre-selected 
participants who were high and low on the ARS, it is possible that a similar result 
would have been found to the one in the Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) study. 
Similarly, the use of a non-clinical sample in this study may have also reduced the 
likelihood of finding a relationship between cognitive flexibility and trait angry 
rumination. Most of the research into cognitive flexibility and anger has been conducted 
with violent offenders and psychiatric patients. Therefore, it may be the case that this 
relationship is only apparent for those people at the more severe ends of the spectrum 
for anger. Further research with a clinical sample and/or with participants who have 
been pre-selected as being high and low on trait angry rumination would help to 
explicate these possibilities.
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The finding that better performance on the non-perseverative errors score from the 
WCST-64 predicted more effective interpersonal problem solving on the MEPS is 
consistent with the small amount of research that has been conducted in this area with 
patients with schizophrenia. For example, as in this study, Hatashita-Wong et al. (2002) 
found that two non-perseverative measures from the WCST (i.e. conceptual level 
responses and categories completed) were correlated with several aspects of 
interpersonal problem solving, such as the correctness, appropriateness and elaboration 
of solutions, as well as the ability to appreciate the possible limitations of solutions. 
Therefore, the results of this study extends the findings of a link between cognitive 
flexibility and social problem solving in patients with schizophrenia, and suggests that 
such a link exists within a non-clinical sample as well. The fact that it was a non- 
perseverative measure of the WCST-64 that predicted performance on the MEPS is 
interesting and contrary to what was predicted. The factor structure of WCST-64 
indicates that all of the non-perseverative scores (i.e. total errors, non-perseverative 
errors, conceptual level responses and categories completed) load on one component, 
which has been interpreted as measuring concept-formation (Kongs et al., 2000). Two 
other factors were also found: a perseveration component and a failure to maintain set 
component. Therefore, in this study, it was the WCST-64 score that measures concept 
formation rather than perseveration that predicted performance on the social problem 
solving measure: the MEPS. It may be that concept formation predicts social problem 
solving because this ability enables people to form concepts about the problem, as well 
as possible solutions to the problem, in the same way that concept formation is thought 
to enable people to form a concept about the correct sorting strategy in the WCST-64.
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The finding that high trait angry rumination predicts poorer interpersonal problem 
solving (i.e. higher scores on the NPO of the SPSI-R) is consistent with both the 
depressive rumination literature and the anger/aggression and interpersonal problem 
solving literature. Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) found that dysphoric ruminators viewed 
their problems more negatively, more severely and less solvable, and themselves as 
being less likely to implement their solutions than dysphoric distractors and non­
dysphoric controls. Further, they found that this negative biased thinking was related to 
the effectiveness of solutions participants generated on the MEPS. This negative 
thinking about problems and ability to solve them is extremely reminiscent of the way 
the NPO scale has been conceptualised, in that it has been defined as a dysfunctional or 
inhibitive cognitive-emotional set that involves the tendency to view problems as a 
threat to well-being, to doubt one’s ability to solve problems successfully, and to 
become easily frustrated and distressed when faced with problems. Therefore, the 
finding in this study that trait angry rumination is associated with a negative orientation 
towards social problem solving is consistent with what has been found for depressive 
rumination.
This result is also consistent with the research that has found a link between anger and 
social problem solving. For example, Tescher et al. (1999) found that high-anger prone 
individuals had lower scores than low-anger prone individuals on the Problem 
Orientation Scale, which, like NPO, measures the motivational component of social 
problem solving. Also, D’Zurilla et al. (2003) found that NPO was positively correlated
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with anger and hostility. Therefore, it seems as though both anger and trait angry 
rumination are associated with a negative orientation to social problem solving. Whilst 
these studies are unable to establish the direction of causality, it seems possible that, as 
has been hypothesised to be the case for depressive rumination, angry rumination may 
enhance an individual’s access to negative, biased thinking, which, in turn, could impair 
their perception of their ability to solve interpersonal problems effectively (i.e. lead to a 
negative problem orientation) and reduce the likelihood of positive interpersonal 
problem solving outcomes. However, it is also possible that a negative problem 
orientation, with its emphasis on threat and low self-efficacy, may lead to ineffectual 
angry rumination on problems instead of engaging in active problem solving. Further 
research is necessary to establish the direction of these relationships.
Finally, the double dissociation found in this study between trait angry rumination 
predicting a negative orientation towards problem solving (i.e. NPO) but not 
interpersonal problem solving effectiveness (i.e. MEPS), and cognitive flexibility 
predicting interpersonal problem solving effectiveness but not a negative problem 
orientation was unexpected. However, it is possible that this reflects the way in which 
the constructs were measured. In particular, both the ARS and the NPO are self-report 
measures, whilst both the WCST-64 and the MEPS are performance measures.
5.2.2. Study 2
The lack of specificity found in this study for the anger induction was surprising and is 
contrary to what was found in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeskema (1998) study. Using
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the same anger induction procedure as the one employed in this study, they found that it 
produced a specific state of anger. However, there may be a number of reasons why this 
study found that the anger induction also increased participants’ sadness levels. Firstly, 
there is a substantial amount of evidence indicating that mood induction procedures 
often elicit multiple affective states instead of producing one specific emotion. After 
reviewing the literature, Polivy (1981) stressed that the negative emotions of 
depression, anxiety and hostility tended to covary. Similarly, S.Vrana (January 1997, 
personal communication, cited in Tescher et al., 1999) concluded that it is almost 
impossible to evoke pure emotion and typically negatively valenced emotions elicit 
other negative emotions. Also, as the anger induction used in this study was idiographic, 
there was little control over the types of memories that participants chose to recall. In 
reviewing the accounts provided by the participants, it appeared as though many of the 
memories involved people close to them betraying or disappointing them in some way, 
which is likely to lead to feelings of both anger and sadness. In fact, several of the 
passages explicitly mention feeling both sadness and anger (e.g. “I am crying a lot and 
flip from being mad to sad and back again”). In future research, it may be helpful to 
induce both anger and sadness in participants in order to try to control for any effects of 
sadness that have been produced by the anger induction.
The results of the response manipulations’ effects on anger state were largely consistent 
with the literature. As was found in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study, 
after the response manipulations, participants in the rumination condition were angrier 
than those in the distraction condition. Also, this study demonstrated that the distraction
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induction resulted in a reduction in participants’ levels of anger, which was also found 
by Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998). However, participants in this study who were 
induced to ruminate maintained their anger levels from pre to post induction, whilst 
participants in the rumination condition in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) 
study demonstrated an increase in their anger state. This suggests that the rumination 
induction used in this study was less successful than the one employed in the Rusting 
and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study. Finally, the finding that the response manipulations 
produced the same pattern of effects for all of the negative mood states provides support 
for the conceptualisation of rumination as functioning in the same way across all 
negative moods.
The finding that both the rumination and distraction groups produced less effective 
solutions to interpersonal problems after the response manipulations compared to before 
was not predicted. Initially, this was interpreted as possibly reflecting fatigue or reduced 
effort on the part of participants. Also, the finding that the rumination group did not 
display less effective interpersonal problem solving compared to the distraction group 
was unexpected and contradicts what has been found in the depressive rumination 
literature. When rumination and distraction have been induced in dysphoric participants 
and non-dysphoric controls, research has consistently shown that the dysphoric 
ruminators produce less effective interpersonal problem solving, on the MEPS, than 
dysphoric distractors and non-dysphoric participants (Lyubomirsky & Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). This null result 
also contradicts the finding in the correlational part of this study that trait angry
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rumination is associated with less effective interpersonal problem solving (i.e. a greater 
negative problem orientation). There may be several possible explanations for these 
discrepancies. Firstly, it may be the case that the anger and rumination inductions 
utilised in this study were not strong enough to overcome participants’ natural responses 
to anger (e.g. suppression) or to interfere with interpersonal problem solving. Given that 
the social problems on the MEPS are relatively straightforward to solve, stronger 
inductions may be necessary to disrupt participants’ interpersonal problem solving 
abilities. Similarly, the depressive rumination research utilised dysphoric participants, 
whereas in this study, angry mood was induced. It may be the case that it is not possible 
to induce this effect in all participants and instead it may only be apparent in those 
people who are anger-prone. Also, the work by O’Neal and Taylor (O’Neal & Taylor, 
1989; Taylor, 1992) highlights the importance of considering the utility of maintaining 
an angry mood. In particular, their studies have found that participants engage in 
behaviours to prolong their angry mood, but only when it is useful to do so (e.g. if they 
have an opportunity to retaliate). Therefore, if participants do not perceive it be useful 
to perpetuate an angry mood, they may be disinclined to engage in angry rumination.
Other possible explanations for this null result centre on the interpersonal problem 
solving construct and how it is measured. Tescher et al. (1999) found that, whilst the 
Problem Orientation scale of the SPSI differentiated high and low anger prone people, 
the two groups did not differ on the Problem Solving Skills scale, which measures the 
ability to define, generate and implement solutions. Also, independent judges were not 
able to discriminate between the two groups on the effectiveness and appropriateness of
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their solutions to anger inducing scenarios. They interpreted these findings as 
suggesting that high-anger prone participants are capable of generating appropriate 
solutions to social problems but that the implementation of these solutions is likely to be 
negatively influenced by their cognitions, emotions and behaviour (i.e. their negative 
orientation to problems). This may help to explain why, in this study, trait angry 
rumination was found to be associated with a negative problem orientation, but that 
when it was induced it did not interfere with people’s abilities to generate effective 
solutions to hypothetical social problems. Other research has found different results 
depending on what aspect of interpersonal problem solving is being measured. For 
example, Evans and Short (1991) found that first responses to social problems did not 
differentiate high versus low aggressive children, but the number of effective second 
responses did. Also, Basquill et al. (2004) found that, on one interpersonal problem 
solving measure, only the ability to identify the positive and negative consequences of a 
solution differentiated aggressive versus non-aggressive adults. Therefore, another 
possible reason why state angry rumination was not found to lead to impairments in 
interpersonal problem solving in this study is that only one aspect of social problem 
solving was measured: means-ends social problem solving. It may be helpful to include 
measures of different stages or aspects of interpersonal problem solving in future 
research.
Finally, the finding that the addition of a cognitive flexibility factor to the above 
analysis resulted in a marginally significant interaction between the three constructs of 
interest (i.e. cognitive flexibility, state angry rumination and interpersonal problem
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solving) may suggest another explanation for why no difference was found between the 
rumination and distraction groups on interpersonal problem solving. The results of this 
analysis indicated that the rumination induction only resulted in less effective 
interpersonal problem solving for those participants who were less cognitively flexible, 
in that it was only this group of participants whose effectiveness scores decreased 
significantly from pre to post anger and response manipulations. Whilst this result needs 
to be interpreted with caution and requires replication because of the marginal level of 
significance, it suggests that the rumination induction does not impair interpersonal 
problem solving uniformly across all participants, and rather does so only for those who 
are less cognitively flexible.
5.2.3. Summary and Conclusions
These findings have implications for the hypothesised model in this study, in which an 
inflexible and perseverative cognitive style underscores trait angry rumination, which, 
in turn, leads to difficulties in interpersonal problem solving. The results of the 
regression analyses performed in study 1 do not support this model, in that trait angry 
rumination was found not to be related to cognitive flexibility and not to mediate the 
relationship between cognitive flexibility and interpersonal problem solving. Further, 
the results demonstrated that cognitive flexibility and trait angry rumination were 
related to different aspects of interpersonal problem solving, in that a negative problem 
orientation was predicted by trait angry rumination, and the ability to generate effective 
solutions to interpersonal problems was predicted by cognitive flexibility. Also, it was a 
non-perseverative measure of the WCST-64 that predicted performance on the social
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problem solving measure, not a perseverative measure. However, the triple interaction 
found in study 2 tentatively (due to the marginal level of significance) indicates that 
some sort of relationship exists between the three constructs: cognitive flexibility, state 
angry rumination and interpersonal problem solving. In particular, the triple interaction 
suggests that cognitive flexibility may moderate the relationship between state angry 
rumination and interpersonal problem solving deficits, in that the relationship between 
these two constructs differed according to the value of cognitive flexibility, with 
rumination leading to poorer interpersonal problem solving only for those participants 
who were less cognitively flexible. Also, unlike the correlational study, in study 2, the 
cognitive flexibility factor that was found to influence the relationship between state 
angry rumination and interpersonal problem solving was a perseverative measure: the 
perseverative errors score from the WCST-64.
How is it possible to reconcile the discrepancies between the findings in the two 
studies? In addition to the potential limitations of the study mentioned previously (i.e. 
that participants were not pre-selected on the ARS, the possible lack of strength of the 
anger and rumination inductions, and the use of the MEPS as the only performance 
measure of social problem solving), there may be other explanations for why these 
differences were found. As discussed earlier, the dissociation found between the 
different aspects of interpersonal problem solving that were predicted by trait angry 
rumination and cognitive flexibility may reflect a difference between whether self- 
report or performance measures were used. In contrast, in the experimental study, all of 
the measures were performance based and angry rumination was induced rather than
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being enquired about. Therefore, it is worth considering whether trait angry rumination, 
as measured by the ARS, is actually quite different to state angry rumination that has 
been induced. Also, the findings from Tescher et al. (1999) discussed earlier suggest 
that anger prone individuals may not have problems generating effective solutions to 
hypothetical social scenarios, but that their negative orientation to problems may 
interfere with their attempts to implement these solutions. Angry rumination may 
operate in a similar manner, which would help to explain why, in this study, trait angry 
rumination was found to be associated with a negative problem orientation but not less 
effective social problem solving on the MEPS, and why state angry rumination did not 
interfere with participants’ ability to generate effective solutions to hypothetical social 
scenarios.
In addition, according to the mood-state dependent hypothesis, cognitive vulnerability 
factors are present in vulnerable individuals, but remain dormant until activated by 
negative mood (Miranda & Persons, 1988). Therefore, it may be necessary to induce 
anger and rumination in order for it to interfere with interpersonal problem solving 
performance. Those participants high on trait angry rumination may be perfectly able to 
solve interpersonal problems when they are in a neutral or positive mood state (i.e. why 
there was no relationship found between ARS and MEPS), but their performance could 
deteriorate after engaging in angry rumination. However, the results of the experimental 
study suggest that this may only be true for those people low on cognitive flexibility. 
Similarly, an individual’s perseverative tendencies may only become apparent and 
interfere with interpersonal problem solving once the person is angrily ruminating. This
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may help to explain why, unlike the experimental study, the correlational study found 
no relationship between the perseverative measures from the WCST-64 and poorer 
interpersonal problem solving on the MEPS. Further research would help to 
discriminate between these various possible explanations and establish whether the 
relationships found in this study are reliable.
5.3. Limitations of the Study
There were a number of limitations in this study, many of which have already been 
mentioned. Firstly, the study was constrained because participants were not pre-selected 
on the basis of being high and low on trait angry rumination. Time constraints meant 
that screening people for trait angry rumination was not feasible. Also, the use of the 
ARS as a screening tool would have alerted participants to the study’s focus on angry 
rumination. A second potential limitation was the potency of the anger and rumination 
inductions. Ethical considerations meant it was necessary to induce a relatively mild 
and transitory state of anger. Therefore, the effects of the anger and rumination 
inductions may not have been strong enough or may not have persisted for long enough 
to have had a detrimental impact on participants’ social problem solving abilities. 
Another possible limitation was the way in which the rumination induction items were 
derived in this study. As the items utilised in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) 
study were not available, new items needed to be generated. The process by which these 
items were produced was not as rigorous as it might have been had there been more 
time available. Whilst a small pilot study was conducted to ensure that the anger
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induction and the rumination and distraction items were effective on the whole, it would 
have been helpful to have had the opportunity to test a range of potential items, in order 
to select those that produced the most potent response in participants. Finally, given the 
research presented earlier, which suggests that whether or not a relationship is found 
between anger/aggression and interpersonal problem solving depends upon what aspect 
of social problem solving is being measured, this study was limited in the use of the 
MEPS, as it only measures a single aspect of interpersonal problem solving: means- 
ends problem solving.
5.4. Implications for Further Research and Clinical Practice
The results of this study provide a first step in determining the relationships between 
cognitive flexibility, angry rumination and interpersonal problem solving, but further 
research needs to be undertaken to see if these findings are reliable and to extend their 
scope. In particular, it would be useful to repeat this study with participants who are 
high and low on trait angry rumination and/or with a clinical (e.g. high anger prone 
individuals) and a non-clinical sample. Also, the inclusion of measures of interpersonal 
problem solving that assess the various aspects and stages involved in social problem 
solving in future research would help to explicate the specific relationships that angry 
rumination and cognitive flexibility have with interpersonal problem solving. Another 
potentially fruitful area for further research is establishing the direction of causality 
between anger and angry rumination and negative problem orientation, as well as the 
consequences of such a negative problem orientation for how people actually engage in
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interpersonal problem solving. In particular, given that a relationship has been found 
between angry rumination and aggression and between angry rumination and a negative 
interpersonal problem solving orientation, it is possible that a negative problem 
orientation may mediate the relationship between angry rumination and aggression. 
Further research is needed to explore the relationships between these factors.
The potential clinical implications of this research are manifold. This study found that 
rumination and distraction resulted in similar consequences for all three negative moods 
(i.e. anxiety, anger and sadness), with rumination maintaining the negative mood and 
distraction reducing it. Therefore, therapeutic interventions aimed at treating rumination 
may be a useful way of combating co-morbidity. Also, the results of this study suggest 
that people who tend to engage in angry rumination are also likely to have a negative 
orientation to social problem solving, which may reduce the likelihood that they engage 
in effective interpersonal problem solving. This, in turn, may result in less positive 
social outcomes and more anger and aggression, which could lead to the establishment 
of a vicious cycle. Therefore, interventions that target both angry rumination and a 
negative orientation to social problem solving are likely to interrupt such a vicious cycle 
and lead to better behavioural outcomes in people with anger-control problems. In 
addition, the results of this study indicate that participants who are more cognitively 
flexible are better at solving social problems. Therefore, interventions aimed at 
promoting greater cognitive flexibility, such as considering multiple viewpoints or 
alternatives to a problem, may enhance social skills training programs and lead to better 
outcomes for aggressive or anger-prone children and adults.
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Part 3: Critical Appraisal
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to reflect upon some of the methodological and conceptual 
issues encountered during the process of conducting this research project. In particular, 
it will focus on the difficulties involved in trying to induce anger and rumination and 
measure interpersonal problem solving. It will also examine the rationale behind the 
choices made during the design of the study and consider what could have been done 
differently.
2. Methodological and Conceptual Issues
2.1. Inducing Anger
As rumination is believed to rely upon the presence of a negative mood to operate, it 
was clear that it would be necessary to induce anger before attempting to induce 
rumination. However, the induction of anger or any other mood has a host of issues and 
difficulties associated with it. These issues, as with most issues in research, involved 
making decisions and compromises that often improved matters in one area but opened 
up difficulties in another area. The issues involved in inducing anger and the choices 
made in relation to these issues will be explored below.
One of the first issues encountered when deciding to induce anger is the ethical 
implications of making people angry. Given that participants may find the experience of
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being made angry unpleasant or stressful, it is usually necessary to limit the amount of 
anger induced in people, thus resulting in quite mild and transient levels of anger. This 
makes it difficult to predict whether the amount of anger that is induced is going to be 
sufficiently strong to result in demonstrable effects that are measurable. Also, the 
potentially transient nature of the anger induced limits the amount of time available to 
study its effects. The particular concern in this study was whether the anger level 
induced (as well as the rumination induction) would be powerful enough and persist for 
long enough to interfere with participants’ interpersonal problem solving ability. This 
uncertainty makes it difficult to know whether any null results that are found are due to 
a lack of effectiveness of the anger induction or whether the predictions are not valid. 
Therefore, there is a trade-off between inducing a level of anger state that is effective 
enough to produce the effects one is interested in and limiting the potentially aversive 
impact on participants of being made angry. In practice, this trade-off tends to result in 
utilising relatively weak anger induction procedures to ensure that participants are not 
unduly distressed, but also results in limitations in the likelihood of finding an effect.
The other ethical dilemma resulting from the induction of anger was the use of 
deception. This was felt to be necessary in order to reduce the likelihood of bias in how 
participants responded to the anger induction. In particular, there was a concern that if 
participants knew that the purpose of the anger induction procedure was to produce 
anger, they may have reported feeling angrier than they actually did because they knew 
that was what the experimenter was looking for. In order to mitigate against ethical 
repercussions, minimal amounts of deception were employed in this study. In particular,
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the aims of the anger and rumination/distraction inductions were withheld, as were the 
specific hypotheses in the study. However, the descriptions of what would be required 
of the participant for each task were accurate. In addition to the ethical implications, the 
strategy of not informing participants of the true purpose of the study also meant that it 
was not possible to pre-select participants who were high and low on angry rumination 
because the use of the Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky, Golub & 
Cromwell, 2001) as a screening tool would have alerted them to the study’s focus on 
angry rumination. Similarly, it meant that the groups (i.e. rumination and distraction 
groups) could not be matched on levels of trait angry rumination or anger, as both the 
ARS and the STAXI-2 were administered at the very end of the procedure to disguise 
the fact that angry rumination was the subject under investigation.
Another methodological issue involved the choice of an idiographic anger induction 
procedure or a hypothetical anger-inducing scenario. In the Rusting and Nolen- 
Hoeksema (1998) study both methods were employed and the idiographic procedure 
produced greater increases in participants’ anger levels. This is most likely because it 
involves recalling an actual event that made the person angry compared to asking them 
to imagine themselves experiencing a hypothetical scenario which has been shown in 
the past to make a group of people angry. For this study, the idiographic anger induction 
procedure was chosen because of its potentially enhanced potency, which was 
confirmed by a small pilot study that was conducted prior to the main research. 
However, the increased effectiveness of the idiographic anger induction procedure came 
at the price of less internal validity. In particular, given that people are recalling
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different memories, they are not really getting the same anger induction, in that people 
may be recalling memories that vary in the amount of anger they elicit in the individual. 
Also, as the memories are from anger experiences that have happened in the past, it is 
possible that the conflict was resolved, thus potentially limiting the amount of anger it 
produces when recalled (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).
In addition to the issues discussed earlier around the potency and sustainability of the 
angry mood, there were further practical methodological problems to overcome in these 
areas. With regards to the sustainability of anger, the specific issue was how to ensure 
that anger was maintained across the rumination manipulation, the mood questionnaires, 
and the interpersonal problem solving measure, given that every new task could 
potentially act as a means of distraction from the angry mood. The potential impact of 
this was mitigated against by re-inducing anger immediately prior to the 
rumination/distraction inductions. Also, the number of scenarios utilised in the 
interpersonal problem solving measure was reduced to two to try to reduce the time 
spent on this measure and, therefore, the likelihood that anger would dissipate. 
However, there was no obvious way to reduce this risk with regards to the mood 
questionnaire, which was felt to be essential to ensure that the inductions were having 
the desired effect. Also, there were additional dilemmas relating to the strength of the 
anger induction. Following the pilot study, the amount of time that people spent on the 
anger induction procedure was reduced from ten minutes, which was the method 
utilised in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study, to five minutes. This was 
done because of feedback that the anger induction procedure was too long. However, it
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is possible that the five minutes given in this study was not enough time to ensure that 
people became angry. One could also argue that if people are given too much time they 
could reach the resolution stage of the conflict, which would potentially reduce their 
levels of anger. Therefore, it may be quite difficult to get the timing right in order to 
maximise the effectiveness of the anger induction. Whilst not possible in this study due 
to time constraints, more extensive pilot work would help to establish the most 
efficacious amount of time to spend on the anger induction.
Another issue related to the anger induction, which only became apparent once data 
collection had begun, was the role of context and culture. In particular, the question as 
to whether the anger induction was sufficient to overcome people’s reluctance to be 
made angry was raised when it became clear that a number of participants’ anger scores 
did not change after the anger induction. One potential explanation for this failure to 
induce anger in some participants is that there may be individual differences in the 
stories that people have about their relationship with anger, which might influence how 
they react to an anger induction. For example, a number of participants stated that they 
are not angry people when they were faced with the prospect of having to recall an 
angry memory. Therefore, the induction may not be sufficient to overcome people’s 
natural responses to anger, such as suppression. Similarly, there are potentially strong 
social pressures, especially on women (e.g. Bimbaum, 1983; Fivush, 1991), not to get 
angry and it may be naive to assume that the experimental situation is immune to these 
contextual pressures. Also, the role of cultural differences may help account for some of 
the variability in participants’ anger scores. Whilst this was not examined in the study,
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there appeared to be some cultural patterns in the way in which participants responded 
on the mood questionnaire. For example, it seemed to be the case that Mediterranean 
cultures reported higher baseline anger scores and greater changes in anger following 
the anger induction.
2.2. Inducing Rumination
In addition to the methodological and conceptual issues regarding the anger induction, 
there were also a number of such issues with regards to the rumination induction. One 
of the key conceptual concerns that became apparent during the process of generating 
the items used to induce rumination was whether the rumination induction would 
genuinely mimic what people do when they engage in angry rumination. It was 
necessary to create a new set of rumination items for use in this study because the 
rumination items employed in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study were not 
made available. In order to do this, items from the ARS (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) and 
attribution theory of anger (Averill, 1982, 1983; Frijda, 1986) were used to derive the 
rumination items. However, it quickly became clear that the theoretical 
conceptualisations of angry rumination (i.e. Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) were not 
supported by evidence. In particular, there appeared to be a distinct lack of qualitative 
analyses regarding the phenomenology of angry rumination. As such, there was a 
concern that the angry rumination items that were produced in this study were based 
upon untested suppositions, which raised uncertainty as to whether or not the angry 
rumination procedure was actually inducing authentic angry rumination.
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As with the anger induction, there were similar issues with regards to the potentially 
transitory nature of angry rumination and how to sustain it. Following the pilot study, 
the procedure adopted in the Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study was modified 
in order to facilitate the prolongation of the angry mood and enhance the potency of the 
rumination induction. In particular, unlike Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998), 
participants were instructed to re-recall the angry memory they chose in the anger 
induction task with their eyes closed and with the experimenter reading the anger 
induction instructions aloud to them. The aim of this was to re-induce the angry mood 
in order to overcome any dissipation effects. Also, contrary to the procedure adopted by 
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998), participants were asked to keep their eyes closed 
while the experimenter went on to read the rumination or distraction items aloud. The 
increased effectiveness of these modifications compared to the original protocol was 
supported by the feedback given in the pilot study. However, as this study failed to find 
that the rumination induction led to increased anger, as was found in the Rusting and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) study, it suggests that this procedure may not have been as 
effective as theirs.
2.3. Measuring Interpersonal Problem Solving
The final area in which a number of methodological and conceptual issues were 
encountered was the measurement of interpersonal problem solving. The Means-Ends 
Problem Solving Procedure (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975) was utilised in this study
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because it is a performance measure of interpersonal problem solving. It was also 
chosen because it is the measure that has been used in all of the research into depressive 
rumination and interpersonal problem solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky, Tucker & Caldwell, 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). However, a 
number of potential problems with this measure became apparent once it began to be 
used. Firstly, the MEPS employs rather straightforward hypothetical social scenarios 
because it was designed for use with a clinical sample (Lyubomirsky & Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1995). Therefore, there was a concern that it might result in ceiling effects 
in our non-clinical sample. However, this worry was not borne out as there appeared to 
be a good degree of variability in the MEPS scores. The potentially simplistic scenarios 
used in the MEPS also led to concerns that it may not be sensitive enough to detect 
changes in interpersonal problem solving effectiveness from pre to post anger and 
response manipulation inductions. This lack of sensitivity may have been one of the 
reasons why no differences were found in this study between rumination and distraction 
groups on the MEPS. Finally, there was a concern about the potential subjectivity 
involved in scoring the responses to the MEPS. Whilst the high inter-rater reliability 
scores found in this study somewhat allayed that worry, there may still be room to query 
whether it relies on too high a degree of subjectivity.
A conceptual issue regarding the use of the MEPS was whether means-ends problem 
solving was the most appropriate aspect of interpersonal problem solving to measure. In 
retrospect, it is worth considering whether it would have been more useful to measure 
interpersonal problem solving in a different way, such as measuring the various stages
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of interpersonal problem solving separately or asking participants to generate multiple 
alternative solutions to hypothetical scenarios. Also, there is some research to suggest 
that hypothetical scenarios have poor ecological validity (Butler & Michenbaum, 1981; 
Kendall & Fischler, 1984), which suggests that this approach to measuring interpersonal 
problem solving may not be very useful. In practice, the MEPS was chosen as the 
interpersonal problem solving measure employed in this study because of both the 
convention regarding what has been used in other studies of rumination and 
interpersonal problem solving and the lack of good alternative measures for 
interpersonal problem solving being readily available.
3. What Could Have Been Done Differently?
Given the methodological issues and potential limitations mentioned above, it becomes 
important to consider what could have been done differently in this study. If there had 
been greater resources and time available, there are a number of improvements that 
could have been made to the research project. Firstly, it would have been helpful to 
conduct more extensive pilot studies on the anger induction procedure. In particular, it 
might have been useful to compare different procedures, such as idiographic and 
hypothetical scenario procedures, to see which resulted in more potent effects. 
Similarly, having the opportunity to test out different aspects of the procedure, such as 
the length of time that participants spend on the anger induction procedure, would have 
potentially resulted in a more optimal outcome. With regards to the angry rumination 
induction procedure, it would have been valuable to have conducted qualitative analyses
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first on the phenomenology of angry rumination and used the results of these analyses 
to generate items for the angry rumination induction. These items could then be 
subjected to further pilot work, in order to establish whether they are a reliable and valid 
means of eliciting angry rumination. In addition, the study could have been improved if 
participants had been pre-selected on the basis of being high or low on trait angry 
rumination on the ARS. However, in order to conceal the purpose of the study, it would 
be necessary uncouple the administration of the ARS from the study. For example, it 
might be possible to administer it as part of a wider battery of measures that are given to 
undergraduate psychology students in one of their laboratory sessions. Suitable 
participants could then be contacted at a later date without specifying that it was their 
responses on the ARS that qualified them for the study.
Other improvements to the study relate to the use of the MEPS. Firstly, it would have 
been better not to rely upon what has been used previously and to have done more 
research to see if a more suitable alternative to the MEPS exists. If such a suitable 
measure does not exist, it might have been helpful to use the MEPS in a different 
manner. For example, the scenarios could have been modified to make them more 
challenging, and more rigorous scoring procedures could have been adopted. Also, 
instead of asking participants to generate the steps involved in reaching a solution, they 
could be invited to produce a number of alternative solutions. This may have particular 
conceptual relevance to both anger and rumination, in that one study found that whilst 
the first solutions to hypothetical social problems did not differentiate aggressive and 
non-aggressive participants, the number of effective second solutions did (Evans &
165
Short, 1991). Also, one might hypothesise that, given its perseverative nature, 
rumination may lead to a narrowing of solutions that an individual is able to generate.
4. Discussion
During the process of conducting this research project, I have grappled with a number 
of methodological and conceptual issues. As with all research, this necessitated making 
difficult decisions and compromises that often seemed to solve one set of problems only 
to open up a different set of dilemmas. The process of conducting this research also 
gave me insight into the difficulty involved in studying anger, which may be one of the 
reasons why it has been relatively neglected by researchers. In particular, even if one 
bypasses the difficulty of identifying participants with ‘anger problems’ by using a non- 
clinical sample and inducing anger, as was done in this study, another set of difficulties 
arise. These include the practical problems of inducing and sustaining angry mood in 
participants, as well as the ethical implications of making people angry. The process of 
carrying out this research also highlighted gaps in the relevant literature. In particular, 
the lack of any qualitative research on the phenomenology of angry rumination or any 
standardised or empirically validated method of inducing angry rumination was 
particularly apparent and possibly limited the effectiveness of this study. Similarly, the 
lack of good quality alternatives to the MEPS meant relying on a potentially 
problematic measure of interpersonal problem solving, which was another weakness in 
the study. Given more time and resources, it would have been useful to redress these
166
limitations by, for example, conducting qualitative research to generate items for the 
angry rumination induction.
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Date: Version Number 1
Volunteer Information Sheet
Study title: “How Thinking Styles Influence Problem Solving”
Researchers: Dr Richard Stott (Clinical Psychologist), Dr Peter Scragg (Clinical 
Psychologist), and Eiryth Finnigan (Trainee Clinical Psychologist), Sub-Department of 
Clinical Health Psychology, 1-19 Torrington Place, London WC1E 6BT. Telephone 
(Mobile): 07957 604 837 Email: eirvth@hotmail.com
*You are being invited to participate in this study of how thinking styles influence 
problem solving. You do not have to take part in this study if you do not want to. If you 
do agree to participate, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without 
having to give a reason.
*The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of thinking and imagination on 
solving interpersonal problems. In particular, I am investigating how general thinking 
styles affect an individual’s ability to solve specific social puzzles. It is hoped that this 
study will help us understand more about how general thinking styles relate to the way 
in which people approach interpersonal problems. This in turn, may help us to develop 
interventions that modify a persons habitual thinking patterns.
*The study will take about an hour and it involves completing a series of tasks and 
questionnaires. Firstly, you will be asked to perform three brief cognitive tasks, in 
which you will sort a deck of cards according to different rules, pronounce a list of 
words, and recall a series of numbers. You will also be given several different scenarios 
involving typical interpersonal problems for you to solve. In addition, you will be given 
an imagination exercise, in which you will imagine yourself in a particular situation, 
and then think about a series of statements. Finally, you will also be asked to fill out 
several questionnaires, including a questionnaire about your current state and one about 
how you tend to solve interpersonal problems.
*A11 information collected during this study will remain strictly confidential. In 
addition, your name will not appear on any data record gathered during this study, and 
no identifying information about yourself will be published in any form. The data will 
be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and will be 
disposed of in a secure manner.
*If you have any questions regarding the research or would like further information, 
please contact one of the researchers at the number above.
* Please retain this information sheet and a copy of the signed consent form for your 
records.
Thank you for considering taking part in this study!
APPROVED BY UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON’S COMMITTEE ON THE 
ETHICS OF NON-NHS HUMAN RESEARCH
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Date:
Version Number 1
Volunteer Consent Form
Title of Study: “How Thinking Styles Influence Problem Solving”
*Have you read the Information Sheet on this study? YES/NO
*Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and YES/NO
discuss the study?
*Have you received satisfactory answers to all of your questions? YES/NO
*Have you received enough information about the study? YES/NO
*Who have you spoken to? ..........................................................
*Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study:
at any time? YES/NO
without giving a reason for withdrawing? YES/NO
*Do you agree to the publication of the results of the study in a YES/NO
research journal and do you understand that you will not be 
identified in these publications?
*Do you agree to take part in the study? YES/NO
Signed Date
Full Name (Block Letters)
Signature of Researcher.................................. Date
APPROVED BY UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON’S COMMITTEE ON THE 
ETHICS OF NON-NHS HUMAN RESEARCH
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Appendix 3
Anger Rumination Scale (Sukhodolsky, Golub & Cromwell, 2001)
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A n g e r  R u m i n a t i o n  S c a le  ( A R S )  S u k h o d o is k y , D . G . ,  G o lu b , A .,  &  C ro m w e l l ,  E . N  (2 0 0 1 )
D a te _ _ _ _ _ _ _  N a m e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  O c c u p a t i o n _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Y e a r s  o f  E d u c a t i o n _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A g e _ _ _ _ _ _ _  G e n d e r __ E t h n i c / R a c i a l  b a c k g r o u n d _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  O t h e r  I n f o r m t i o n _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Directions: Everyone gets angry and frustrated occasionally but people differ in the ways that they think about their 
episodes of anger. Statements below describe different ways that people may be recalling or thinking about their anger 
experiences. Please, read each statement and then respond by circling the appropriate number for each statement. There 
are no right or wrong answers in this questionnaire, and your honest responses that best describe yourself are very 
important. Please, respond to all items.
A lm o st S o m e- O fte n  A lm o st
never
1.1 ruminate about my past anger experiences. 1
times
9 3
always
4
2 .1 ponder about the injustices that have been done to me. 1 ..... 2..... 3 4
3 .1 keep thinking about events that angered me for a long time. 1 ..... 2...... 3 4
4 .1 have long living fantasies of revenge afrer the conflict is over. 1 ■? 3 4
5 .1 think about certain events from a long time ago and they still make me angry. 1 7 3 4
6 .1 have difficulty forgiving people who have hurt me. 1 9 3 4
7. After an argumeni is over, I keep fighting with this person in my imagination. 1 9 3 4
8. Memories of being aggravated pop up into my mind before I fall asleep. 1 9 3 4
9. Whenever I experience anger, I keep thinking about it for a while. 1 .......2 . . . . 3 4
10.1 have times when I can not stop being preoccupied with a particular conflict. 1 9 3 4
11.1 analyze events that make me angry. 1 9 3 4
12.1 think about the reasons people treat me badly. 1 .......2 . . . . 3 4
13.1 have daydreams and fantasies of violent nature 1 9 3 4
14.1 feel angry about certain things in my life. 1 9 3 4
15. When someone makes me angry, I can’t stop thinking about how to get back at tills person. 1 2 ...3.. 4
16. When someone provokes me. I keep wondering why this should have happened to me. 1 9 3 4
17. Memories of even minor annoyances bother me for a while. 1 9 3 4
18. When something makes me angrv, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind. 1 9 3 4
19.1 re-enact the anger episode in my mind after it has happened. 1. .......2 . . . . 3 .....4
Notes:
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Appendix 4
Mood Questionnaire
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Please rate your current state on the following items. Please circle the number 
that best describes your current state from 1 = “not at all” to 9 = “extremely”.
Currently, I  am:
Not at all
Extremely
* Happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Curious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Excited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Creative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Bored 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Shy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Depressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Disgusted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Frightened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Pleased 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Annoyed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* Confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Appendix 5
Rumination and Distraction Items
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Rumination Items:
Think About:
1. why the event happened
2. what you thought about at the time
3. how you felt at the time
4. why the person treated you the way they did
5. why what happened to you was unfair
6. how you’d like to get back at them or get even
7. why the event should not have happened
8. memories you have of similar events that have happened in the 
past
9. why this happened to you
10. why it was wrong for them to treat you as they did
11. what you wanted to say or do but didn’t
12. how the other person should have acted
13. why you did not deserve what happened to you
14. whether you’d like to take revenge
15. why the other person should not have treated you that way
16. other times people have treated you unfairly
17. how unjust the whole situation was
182
Distraction Items:
Think About:
1. imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic
2. the layout of a typical classroom
3. the shape of a large black umbrella
4. the movement of an electric fan on a warm day
5. raindrops sliding down a windowpane
6. picture a full moon on a clear night
7. clouds forming in the sky
8. the layout of the local shopping centre
9. imagine a plane flying overhead
10. fire darting around a log in a fire-place
11. two birds sitting on a tree branch
12. the layout of the local post office
13. the pattern on an Oriental rug
14. the shape of the continent of Africa
15. a band playing outside
16. the way the ocean looks at sunset
17. a train stopped at a station
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